The fears about loose nukes are baseless. In fact, many analysts had failed to comprehend that if a state manufactures nuclear devices, despite the entire developed world’s opposition, it could be capable enough to guard them adequately
The endless debate in the Western media about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons security is a reflection of Western analysts prejudice approach or shortsightedness. These analysts chalk out baseless nightmares and question Pakistan’s nuclear weapons security arrangements. The disturbing variable is that this group of analysts seem convinced that extremists residing in Pakistan would seize the country’s nuclear assets with the assistance of disloyal junior officers and soldiers of Pakistani armed forces. This is a dangerous development for Pakistan’s national security.
In the aftermath of 9/11 there has been a major surge in the security debate and government spending in several countries on many dimensions of weapons of mass destruction terrorism, including a reassessment of the readiness and ability of non-state actors to resort to nuclear violence. The governments’ serious approach towards nuclear terrorism encouraged many security analysts to spell out scenarios in which nuclear material could be employed. According to their findings nuclear terrorism include the theft or purchase of fissile material leading to the fabrication and detonation of a crude nuclear weapon -- an improvised nuclear device; and the theft and detonation of an intact nuclear weapon.
Pakistan became centre of these debates after the discloser of ‘AQ Khan network’. Nevertheless, Pakistan redressed the problem by tightening physical and material control and monitoring closely the activities of personnel associated with the nuclear programme. The Majlis-e-Shoora legislated comprehensive national legislation entitled “Export Controls on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, 2004, in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. Earlier in February 2000, Islamabad announced the establishment of a Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) to manage its nuclear forces. The NCA is responsible for policy formulation and exercise employment and development control over all strategic forces and strategic organisations. The Strategic Planning Division (located in joint services headquarters) acts as the secretariat for the NCA and is responsible for ensuring a reliable command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence network.
In addition to institutional arrangements, Pakistan maintains its nuclear arsenals in what analysts commonly characterize as a recessed state. The unconstituted nature of the arsenal not only minimises the risks of nuclear weapons’ use through inadvertence, accident, or a command and control failure, but it also forecloses the possibility of the seizure of an assembled weapon or cache of weapons by radicals. Though these acts of Islamabad has strengthened safety and security of its nuclear arsenals, but failed to end the maligning propaganda against it.
Since the beginning of November 3, 2007, the leading newspapers in the West have been writing that increased instability in Pakistan due to proclamation of emergency could make Pakistan's nuclear weapons and stocks of nuclear explosive material dangerously vulnerable to theft by militant groups, and therefore the United States and British elite forces must carefully craft external contingency plan for direct intervention in Pakistan to prevent the weapons from falling into militants hands. For instance, Frederick Kagan, an associate of American Enterprise Institute, a think-tank with strong ideological ties to the Bush administration, had discussed various options for Bush Administration to seize Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. He stated that: “sending elite British or US troops to secure nuclear weapons capable of being transported out of the country and take them to a secret storage depot in New Mexico or a "remote redoubt" inside Pakistan; sending US troops to Pakistan's north-western border to fight the Taliban and al-Qaeda; and a US military occupation of the capital Islamabad, and the provinces of Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan if asked for assistance by a fractured Pakistan military, so that the US could shore up President Pervez Musharraf and General Ashfaq Kayani…” (The Guardian, December 1, 2007).
Similarly, John E McLaughlin, the No 2 official at the CIA from 2000 to 2004 stated: “If the situation becomes more volatile, the conventional wisdom (about nuclear security) could come into question.” He claimed that Pakistan's army has become increasingly diverse, reflecting the country's ethnic and religious differences, and that is different from the way it was years ago.” (Washington Post, November 11, 2007).
Importantly, the Western analysts deliberately ignore the actual facts, hypothesize scare-scenarios and above all recommend impractical solutions. They outlandish external contingencies plan, and fail to realize that Pakistan possesses adequate retaliatory capacity to defend its strategic assets. The armed forces of Pakistan are professional and thereby there is no possibility of existence of disloyal officers or soldiers in security agencies. The professional and highly trained armed forces of Pakistan are capable to secure country’s nuclear assets, without the assistance of Western forces.
To conclude, the fears about loose nukes are baseless. In fact, many analysts had failed to comprehend that if a state manufactures nuclear devices, despite the entire developed world’s opposition, it could be capable enough to guard them adequately. Secondly, the Armed forces of Pakistan are professional and disciplined. Thus, it is imperative that these so called experts ought take into account the real facts about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons security mechanism and give up their habit of chalking out chilling scenarios.
