In the past eight years, Pervez Musharraf was used to ultimate power principally because he wore the uniform of the Chief of Army Staff. In that capacity, he could say and do whatever he wanted. General Musharraf was supposed to shed this uniform in December 2004, as part of an unwritten pledge with the MMA, but he didn’t, citing “national interest” as an excuse. Subsequently, amid mounting criticism on the issue, he even equated the uniform with the skin on his body.
General Musharraf would have loved not to shed what was physically so crucial to him, if the domestic and international pressure on the uniform issue had not gained as much momentum as it did in recent months, especially in the aftermath of his declaration of emergency in the country on November 3. Even his new position as civilian President is precarious, since his e-election on this five-year slot is sanctioned by a Supreme Court bench, whose members had taken oath under the PCO.
Moreover, a simple majority of the former national and provincial parliaments may have elected him, but there is no guarantee that the assemblies which are elected in the forthcoming elections will abide by the previous parliamentary verdict on the October 2007 presidential polls.
More importantly, the main opposition leaders, including Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, as well as the civil society have made the restoration of judiciary as one of the main preconditions for the restoration of democracy in the country. The restoration of judiciary under the “sacked” Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry would mean the case of Musharaf’s re-election would be re-heard by the Supreme Court. A possible outcome of this re-hearing could be his disqualification as President.
Rationale for Uniform
General Musharaf’s main rationale for keeping his uniform, especially before the American leadership, was that Pakistan under his leadership was fighting a War on Terror, which necessitated his retention of the post of the Chief of Army Staff. Ever since the Americans began the war effort in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11, the country has deployed its troops along the Afghan border. In the past nearly four years, over 80,000 troops have combated pro-Taliban forces in North and South Waziristan agencies.
In this backdrop, Musharaf’s argument has been that it is essentially due to his position as the army chief that the country was able to operate militarily against pro-Taliban elements. In other words, according to his rationale, mere civilian presidency would significantly erode his ability to manage counter-terrorism military operations in the country. He would then have to approach the new army chief each time a vital step needed to be taken vis-à-vis the War on Terror-related military operation by the government of Pakistan.
Since Thursday, the country has a new army chief in the person of General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani. General Musharraf as army chief may have played a crucial role in General Kiyani’s promotion to the post of Vice Chief of Army Staff. And as a subordinate, General Kiyani can be expected to show due respect and regard for his former boss. However, it is he not Musharraf who will now command the army, and therefore, would have to tackle all the challenges that the army faces in the coming days of the country’s counter-terrorism campaign.
In both public perception and actual reality, the military remains Pakistan’s most powerful and most disciplined institution. It is essentially the responsibility of the army chief to ensure this power and discipline. General Musharraf surely leaves behind a strong legacy as army chief. Even after he assumes a civilian office, that strong legacy may continue. However, it is obvious that military-specific decisions will now be made by General Kiyani. And he would have to make these decisions in view of the mounting security predicament facing the country as a direct outcome of its counter-terrorism effort, which, thus far, has been led by the army.
American Expectation
For the past couple of years, it is amply clear that the United States is not satisfied with Pakistan’s role in the War on Terror. Bush Administration’s top officials, especially Deputy Secretary of State John Negoponte, have frequently alleged that the country’s tribal region has become a safe haven for pro-al-Qaeda and Taliban forces to conduct their international terrorist operations. Therefore, Washington expects the country’s leadership to “deliver more” in the War o Terror.
How can Pakistan “deliver more” without Pervez Musharraf as army chief? If the justification that Musharraf had been offering in defense of his keeping the army chief post is taken to be true, then his decision to surrender the uniform is likely to complicate Pakistan’s role in the War on Terror.
The country could not “do more” in the War on Terror during a time when Musharraf was in full control of both the civilian and military centres of power—the former allowing him to muddle through political challenges when and as they arose, and the latter enabling him to ensure a smooth chain of command in the country’s counter-terrorism military campaign.
How can then Musharraf be expected to “deliver more” in the War on Terror as merely a civilian President? The American script for Pakistan that became quite obvious through the controversial deal between Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto, and led to the latter’s return to the country from political exile, was to create a moderate political front against religious extremists and terrorists through the forthcoming elections.
In fact, Mr Negroponte is on record having said that he would like to see Benazir Bhutto (as third time prime minister) stand next to Musharraf (as second time civilian President). However, by imposing emergency, General Musharraf offended both Bhutto and the Americans. That is why the PPP reneged on the so-called deal by calling for Musharaf’s resignation. During his recent trip to Islamabad, Mr Negroponte attempted to salvage the deal by asking Musharraf to lift emergency and urging Bhutto not to confront Musharraf.
Boycotting Elections
However, since Nawaz Sharif’s return to Lahore on Sunday from Saudi Arabia, the political scenario in the country has radically changed. Ms Bhutto has welcomed Sharif’s return. Even though the two leaders have given Saturday, the 29th of November, as the deadline for Musharaf to end the emergency role by restoring the Constitution and the Judiciary and lifting the curbs on media as the deadline for their participation in the January 8 elections, they have filed their nomination papers for the elections.
By shedding his army uniform, Musharraf has met one of PPP’s main demands. If the said move satisfies Ms Bhutto, and if she is still willing to abide by the so-called deal predicated on the US plan for the realization of a “Musharaf-Bhutto moderate front” through the forthcoming elections, then the PPP will not agree to an election boycott. If Mr Sharif listens to pleas of his APDM partners, especially Qazi Hussain Ahmad and Imran Khan, to boycott elections, then there is a danger that PML-Q will fill the vacuum created by PML-M’s absence from elections.
It is clear that, unlike Ms Bhutto, Mr Sharif has not returned to Pakistan by making a deal with Musharraf. He took a hurried trip to the Kingdom to stop the return of the PML-N leader, but Saudi King Abdullah is believed to have prevailed upon him to ensure the safe comeback of Mr Sharif, whom they prefer over Ms Bhutto for a host of personal and ideological reasons. If Mr Sharif’s nomination papers are not ejected, then obviously his participation in the election will threaten the Chaudhrys in Punjab.
Disowning Chaudhrys
It is Musharraf’s dependence upon the Chaudhrys of Gujrat, Chaudhry Shujaat Husain and Chaudhry Pervez Ilahi, that seems to have created much of the current political turmoil in the country. It can be argued that in the past five years of PML-Q rule, the Chadhrys were dependent upon Musharaf more than Musharraf was depended upon them. For they were the ones who, along with the remnants of General Ziaul Haq’s Islamization like Ijazul Haq, essentially scuttled General Musharaf’s bids to proactively combat religious extremists and terrorists.
Musharraf’s US-sponsored deal with Ms Bhutto required that he should have gradually disowned the Chaudhrys and entered into a pragmatic and realistic arrangement with the PPP, one of the country’s largest political parties. Instead, what has happened is that the Chaudrys have succeeded in sabotaging the deal by entrapping Musharaf into declaring emergency—a step that has virtually isolated Musharaf, both domestically and internationally.
Obviously, General Musharraf could not disown the Chaudhrys even after Ms Bhutto’s return, because he needed PML-Q’s support for his presidential re-election, and, even in its aftermath, his re-election case was in the hands of the Supreme Court. By declaring emergency, General Musharraf preempted the Supreme Court verdict, as he feared it to disqualify his re-election as President.
Election Outcome
After shedding the army uniform, which has been the ultimate source of his power, Pervez Musharaf still has this option of disowning the opportunistic political forces which were more of a liability on him all these years. Obviously, now he may be playing such a real-politic game on a much weaker footing. However, everything depends upon what position Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif adopt on the 29th of November and beyond.
If they boycott the elections, and the elections take place under emergency, then January 8 will trigger another round of political turmoil in the country, putting Musharraf’s cronies in power again. If they do not boycott the elections, then the outcome of these elections will depend upon whether they are held freely and transparently.
In the absence of widespread electoral rigging, and provided the mainstream parties participate in the elections, the new parliament may decide to annul the decision of its predecessor to re-elect Musharraf as President. More importantly, however, the post-election scenario may see a greater push by both political parties and civil society for the restoration of judiciary under the “sacked” Chief Justice of Supreme Court Chaudhry Iftikhar Muhammad. Such an eventuality poses even a bigger challenge to Musharraf’s future as civilian President.
The only way the former General can overcome the present political crisis is to open the political field for all parties and their leaders in the election campaign, and not let just the PML-Q led by the Chaudhry brothers to capitalize on the post-emergency situation, and then hold free and fair elections. By doing so, Musharraf may be able to convince both Benazir and Nawaz to “forgive and forget” what he did to them in the past eight years.
