In 2004, guided by the neo-conservative goal of re-enforcing US power in the Middle East in the guise of the War on Terror, the Bush Administration came up with the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) to institutionalize broader social, economic and political reforms in the Middle East. Just a year ago, the US invasion of Iraq without UN Security Council mandate had been staunchly criticized by European Union (EU)’s major players such as Germany and France.
A range of European objections surfaced against this Initiative’s proposal for greater transatlantic cooperation on Middle East reform. One concern was with the US trying to use the EU’s well-established presence in the region for its own ends and wrest control from European initiatives. The most specific European complaint was that the Greater Middle East Initiative was not drawn up in consultation with either governments or civil society in the Middle East.
Despite such criticism, at the G-8, US-EU and NATO summits in 2004, the EU agreed to partner with the US in GMEI. In order to sign up to a common initiative at June 2004 G8 summit, the European members insisted on far-reaching revisions in the GMEI, including changing its name to the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) Initiative, a strengthened link between reform efforts and progress on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the key requirement of  consultation with Arab governments (for which a ministerial mechanism called the Forum for the Future was set up).
US-EU differences pertain to basic assumptions about political change in the region, including the role of the Arab-Israeli peace process, the policy towards Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and how to deal with the war in Iraq. With reference to democratization of the Middle East, while the EU prefers an incremental, structural political change in the region, the US, at least under the Bush administration, has favored regime change through the use of force. But the difference only pertains to the manner of bringing about political change in the Middle East.
Insofar as the broader goal of democratization is concerned, there is enormous compatibility in trans-Atlantic perceptions and policies. In fact, the EU shares with the US an important contradiction in the discourse over democracy insofar as their refusal to deal with the democratically-elected regime of Palestinian Hamas is concerned. Likewise, in the case of Iran’s nuclear issue and the war in Iraq, the trans-Atlantic interests may have completely diverged in the recent past. However, over time, they tend to converge. 
US-EU differences over democratization of the Middle East are generally perceived to be at the heart of the trans-Atlantic divide in the aftermath of the US-led invasion of Iraq. It is often argued that the US pursues a short-term coercive approach of imposing democracy through regime change, as has been the case in Iraq; while the EU follows a long-term policy to gradually achieve sustainable democratic transformation in the region.
No doubt differences exist in respective approaches of the EU and the US on the issue of promoting democracy in the Middle East, especially over the manner and time frame of bringing about regional political change. But these differences are not as fundamental as they are generally perceived, and even if they appeared to be so on the eve of the Iraq War, that is no more the case now. Whatever differences remain now arise out of  competitive interests of the US and EU in the Middle East and, therefore, do not constitute any conflicting trends.
In fact, we can trace a number of similarities between American and European approaches towards democracy promotion in the Middle East. For instance, in the post-9/11 period,  the US and the EU have commonly perceived democratization in the Middle East as crucial for Western security against terrorism. Both have expressed strong commitment to democracy promotion in the region, because the lack of democracy and the consequent authoritarianism there is perceived by them as a major cause of religiously-inspired terrorist violence. 
Another major similarity between the respective policies of the US and the EU towards Middle Eastern democratization is that, in  both cases, enthusiasm for democratizing the region has waned significantly in the last few years, especially since the 2005 victory of Hamas in Palestinian elections,  the electoral gains of the Islamist parties in Lebanon and Egypt and the emergence of regional security issues.
A couple of years from the run-up to the US-led invasion of Iraq onwards, when the neo- conservative agenda of the Bush Administration was at its climax, the trans-Atlantic relationship was at its lowest ebb. However, since 2006, the coming to power of conservative leaders in France and Germany, President Nicholas Sarkozy and Chancellor Angela Merkel, respectively, as well as moderate outlook of the Bush administration on the issue of democracy promotion in the Middle East caused in principal by unexpected outcome of the regime change in Iraq, have helped bridge US-EU policy differences over the issue of democracy promotion in the Middle East.
As Tamara Wittes and Richard Youngs argue, the divergence in EU and US approaches to democracy promotion in the Middle East is more apparent than real; notwithstanding mutual recriminations, the two actors in practice produced remarkably similar policies.
Where real policy divergence does exist, it appears rooted in contrasting foundations
and motivations from which the two actors seek to construct their respective
democracy promotion policies in the Middle East. Some improvement in transatlantic
coordination in the Middle East has been forthcoming since the low-point of 2003-
2005, helped by the arrival of new leaders in France and Germany as well as by a
sobered attitude toward the challenge of Arab political reform. At bottom, both European and American officials have struggled with the same two issues: whether and how to offer Arab governments meaningfully significant incentives for democratic reform; and how to mesh the long-term objective of supporting democracy with short-term strategic objectives.
Wittes and Youngs point out at least five aspects of transatlantic similarity in approaching the issue of democracy in the Middle East. A couple of these similarities are worth-narrating here. First, European and US policy have, in practice, followed a very similar evolutionary trajectory: strong commitments to democracy promotion in the Middle East after the attacks of 9/11 gave way to far greater caution in the period since 2006 began. The general American and European commitments to intensify support for democratic change in the Middle East after 9/11 were justified in strikingly similar terms. Neither the United States nor the European Union lived up to these commitments. But even the language of support for freedom began to fade in 2006, following several negative political developments in the region which led both American and European leaders to begin to question whether democratization in the Middle East would indeed bring the changes to regional politics that they sought.
In the spring of 2005, the first Lebanese parliamentary elections after Syria’s withdrawal brought Hizballah more seats and stronger government representation. In the fall of same year, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood made a strong showing in parliamentary elections, winning 85 seats in the 454-seat lower house. Then, in January 2006, Iraqis voted in their first post-Saddam parliamentary elections and handed victory to sectarian, militia-backed parties; and Palestinians handed a resounding victory to the militant, anti-Israeli movement Hamas.
Secondly, the US and the EU have coordinated their policies in pursuing ties with  Middle Eastern states such as Libya and Lebanon. In Libya,  a united front between London and Washington led to agreement with Libya in December 2003 that the North African country would abandon its WMD programs and formally renounce terrorism in a letter to the United Nations. Britain’s main role was in mediating with Qadafi over the prospect of normalizing relations with Washington. Anglo-American coordination lasted beyond the WMD agreement, with a US-UK- Libyan forum being established to take forward cooperation on Libyan defense reform.
While this caused some consternation among other EU states, rather smoothly and undramatically this longstanding source of major transatlantic tension dissipated, and US and EU strategies have since converged on a basic commonality of approach. Since 2006, both the US and European governments have rushed to conclude new energy deals with Libya, overlooking human rights issues.  Perhaps the most striking instance of close policy coordination has been that between France and the United States in Lebanon. Not only did Paris and Washington jointly lead the way on UNSC Resolution 1559 in the fall of 2004, but after Syrian troops withdrew in May 2005, the French government pointed to new coordination between France, Britain and the US on removing Syria’s ‘residual presence’ in Lebanon.
Differences have emerged over the years since, over America’s interest in using the Lebanese situation to pressure Syria, and over the Sarkozy administration’s interest in mediating between different Lebanese factions, including through engagement with Hizbollah. But, the significance of the US and France working so closely together on a pro-democracy agenda in a Middle Eastern has not been negligible. One concrete outcome is the improved vigor and effectiveness of the post-2006 UNIFIL deployment in southern Lebanon.
What is clear from the above narration  is that the transatlantic divide caused primarily with the March 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq  has narrowed down considerably in the past few years, which have seen greater coordination between the US and the EU over the  issue of democracy promotion in the Middle East. A United States under the Democratic presidency of Barack Obama will help overcome the remaining areas of divergence between the US and the EU on Middle Eastern democratization.