The United States and India are inching closer to their landmark nuclear deal. The latest stride made in the direction is a momentous one – the approval of an inspection plan by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The deal if reached and put into effect would enable the United states to transfer nuclear related facilities and expertise to India. Previously, the Manmohan Singh led Congress government won some domestic ground by surviving the scare of a no confidence vote in Lok Sabha – the lower, popularly elected house of the India Parliament. The deal, which is very certain to be reached after the erosion of internal and external barriers, will be one of the most important achievements of the Congress government – or at least this is what the government believes.
Under the IAEA safeguards agreement, the UN monitors will have access to 14 Indian nuclear reactors in the next 6 years. Six reactors have already been specified for monitoring under the existing safeguards agreement. The US State Department and the Indian government have welcomed the support that the agreement had been able to garner in the IAEA Board of Governors meeting.
While endorsing the agreement, the IAEA Director General Mohamad El Baradi also expressed his optimism regarding ultimate realization by the United States and India leading to a debate on disarmament. He said that the safeguard agreement ‘is good for India; it is good for the world’.
Despite the ratification of the agreement through a consensus, the passage of agreement was not entirely smooth. The criticism surprisingly came from unusual quarters. The foremost criticism over the text of the agreement was over the ambiguous wording that many foresaw as something that could amount to limitations over monitoring of the specified Indian nuclear reactors.
While India expected China and Pakistan to be the foremost critics inside and outside the Board of Governors, it was the host Austria that was most critical of the agreement. Austria iterated its resolve that had the agreement been put to voting it would have been compelled to have voted against it. Austria reaffirmed its stance against the use of nuclear energy. It, however, requested a legally binding list of nuclear facilities that IAEA inspectors would have access to in all circumstances. There were also reports coming out of the meeting regarding the concerns put across by Ireland and Switzerland.
Iran, which was not a member of the Board of Governors, also communicated its reservations over the agreement. Speaking on the occasion as a non-member, Ali Asgher Soltanieh, the top Iranian diplomat to the UN agency, said that the agreement brings to light the American double standards. He said that the precedent would lead to the undermining of the credibility and integrity of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). He expressed serious Iranian concerns relating to American efforts at following the same act to legitimize the Israeli nuclear program.
Pakistan, which comes across as a traditional rival and an opponent to India’s nuclear program, was strident in its opposition to the agreement. However, Pakistan circumvented opposition to the consensus approval. The Pakistani averting of opposition can be explained in two ways: first, as The Economic Times had reported referring to a statement by the US ambassador to India, David C. Mulford, in its 23 July issue, the United States had convinced Pakistan not to vote against India at the meeting. It is not hard to imagine, therefore, that Pakistan would have experienced a change of heart after the exercise of determining convincing abilities of the United States.
Second and more proper explanation for the Pakistani approval was the interest of Pakistan to follow the same precedent for the acquisition of nuclear energy. The Foreign Office confirmed the same grounds for approval and said that the agreement had set a precedent for more countries to enter similar agreements for meeting its energy needs. Pakistan showed its resolve to follow the same route to gain international cooperation to access nuclear energy.
The changing Pakistani approach has to be seen in the context of the current international system of constraint and opportunities. It was difficult for Pakistan to disapprove of the agreement after the United States asked it to approve the same. However, the method of approval could have been a bit more diplomatic than it was. Before the meeting, Pakistan wrote letters to various countries trying to accumulate opposition to the signing of agreement, yet Pakistan did not raise its voice in disapproval on the forum. The more appropriate method for Pakistan would have been the one adopted by Austria. It should have gone with the consensus, but it should have also aired the concerns that it had earlier articulated in the letters. It would have been more diplomatic and graceful for the country.
The ‘umbrella’ safeguards agreement did invite criticism from expert agencies and the Indian opposition parties as well – for very contrasting reasons though. The Arms Control Association questioned the legal implications of various omissions that had been made specifically for India. It passed a negative judgment on the liberal concessions India has been provided in the agreement. The Association held that Article 52 of the agreement suggested that India could end the safeguards or take other ‘corrective measures’ if supplies are cut off. The clause would stand even after the supplies are being cut off as a result of nuclear testing by India. The Association has taken a legalistic stance on the issue and has emphasized the potential adverse impacts that these concessions would have on the states such as Iran.
Although the vote of no confidence against the Manmohan government failed, the domestic criticism of the Indo-US nuclear deal and of the IAEA safeguards is unrelenting. The former coalition partner Communist Party of India asserted that the agreement would result in the perpetual monitoring of the 14 Indian civilian nuclear facilities. The party also disagreed with the interpretation of “corrective measures” by the Indian government. It stated that it had been made clear by El Baradi that the agreement is of indefinite duration. The largest opposition party BJP has termed the agreement “strategic subservience”. Referring to a statement by Nicholas Burns, the BJP spokesman said that in case India would conduct nuclear tests in the future, the US can take back not only the fuel but also the machinery.
The struggle for India does not end here. In the next phase, India will have to strike a deal with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a group of 45 countries that export nclear material. Austria has already hinted that a consensus at the IAEA Board of Governors does not necessarily mean a similar response in the meeting of NSG that will be held on 21 August. Indian diplomats are by now roaming around the world in a bid to convince the members of NSG to get their support. At the end, India will have to wait for the approval of the Indo-US nuclear deal by the US Congress. The session of the Congress may delay a voting on the bill till next year.
