The Bush Administration seemed convinced about the involvement of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) officials with the Muslim militants. A few Pakistanis in critical places have also expressed similar concerns in their writings. This impression about Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency severely undermines Islamabad’s credibility and sincerity as a partner in the war on terrorism. It also provides an opportunity to the anti-Pakistan forces to comfortably malign or tarnish the image of the country and logically justify US/ISAF/NATO/Afghanistan coalition’s hot-pursuit strategy to strike targets within Pakistan. In addition, this distrust could undermine efforts to tackle Taliban and Al Qaeda militants. What is the authenticity of these facts?  What is to be made of these allegations?
It was reported that during Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani’s visit to Washington the Central Intelligence Agency chief Michael V. Hayden had an exclusive meeting with the Prime Minister. During the meeting he presented him a “charge-sheet” on Pakistani intelligence agencies’ alleged involvement in jihadi activities in Afghanistan. According to the Defence Minister Chaudhry Ahmed Mukhtar, President Bush also told Prime Minister Gilani that elements in the ISI were passing on information to Taliban that helped them avoid attacks by American and Pakistani forces.
The accuracy of the facts, which CIA had made public through the media or shared with the high-ups in Islamabad and Washington, is debatable. It seems illogical that the agency which is dominated by professional serving military officers and soldiers should be helping the militants who are engaged in killing Pakistani soldiers. Why Americans allege the agency? The Americans have been relying on electronic gadgets and local informers for intelligence gathering. Both these sources of intelligence gathering have immense limitations in the Afghanistan and Federally Administer Tribal Areas. The electronic gadgets do not make distinction between the militants and law abiding Tribals. This limitation of the superior forces is always in the advantage of rebellious forces that opt for guerilla war fighting strategy.
The second category--the local informers—also have acute limitations. Agreed these individuals are inhabitants of the target areas. But the problem is that these areas have tribal social setup and parochial political culture.  In the tribal society people have close contacts and have correct knowledge about the activities of their fellow tribesmen. Secondly, the Taliban and Muslim foreign radicals have acceptability in the trouble areas of Afghanistan. Similarly, they enjoy respect in the tribal areas of Pakistan. These factors in the closed tribal society very easily expose the informer or individual activities. The insurgents very comfortably eliminate him. Hence, there is a possibility that some informers remain outside the area and pass fake information to the coalition forces commanders for the sake of payment. Moreover, one cannot ignore the role of anti-Pakistani forces, which have been gaining strength under the patronage of President Hamid Karazai government in Afghanistan. These forces could hatch a conspiracy and give erroneous information to the Americans to malign Pakistan and create distrust between Islamabad and Washington. In this context, one cannot ignore the role of double agents. 
Since the last month New Delhi and Washington has been targeting ISI with a clear purpose. The Indians high ups announced to destroy the agency. To accomplish this plan they have been propagating against the agency with the assistance of western media. On August I, 2007 The New York Times reported that “American intelligence agencies have concluded that members of Pakistan’s powerful spy service helped plan the deadly July 7 bombing of India’s embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan.” Simultaneously, the Bush Administration had been frustrated due to the increasing causalities of American troops in Southern Afghanistan. The coalition forces have failed to eliminate the terrorists from Afghanistan. Therefore, they have to shift the blame. In this context, the easiest target is Pakistani intelligence agency.
The immediate reaction of Islamabad was inappropriate. Though Pakistan Army has reacted to the allegation and its spokesman has rejected the New York Times report as unfounded, baseless and malicious. But the other government circles remained salient or confused. In fact, they were engaged in putting the ISI under the complete control of Interior ministry, headed by a non elected advisor to the prime minister. Interestingly, this move was rejected by the strong critics of ISI, who believe that the agency is not a sacred cow and a democratically elected government has every right to do it. This is due to the timing of notification and function of the agency. The primary responsibility of the ISI is defense intelligence, which is not in the domain of Interior Ministry.     
In addition to the external powers, some sections of Pakistani society also expressed their serious concerns about the involvement of the agency in domestic politics. They argued that agency has been involved in certain political activities, which were not mandated. Its involvement in the internal affairs of the state has politicized it. The involvement of the agency in the domestic politics is not a new development. Since the early seventies, both the military dictators and democratically elected chief executives had used the agency for political advantageous. These acts have, obviously, increased and strengthen the agency’s penetration in the internal political affairs of the country.    
The impression persists in the sections of society that the ISI has always been destabilizing the civilian governments. The critical evaluation of the working of civilian governments reveals that they themselves failed to perform. In fact, the political parties rely on the individual wisdoms and also maintain over-centralized decision-making apparatus that negate the spirit of democracy and obstruct the evolution of participatory culture within the society and decision making process. They lack think tanks support or professional input on the important issues during policy making process, which minimizes the affects of outcomes. For example, the recent decision of present government regarding the two intelligence agencies exposed its ignorance. The constitutional head of the government, Yousuf Raza Gilani, was on his very important foreign visit and decision was announced in his absence without realizing the actual function of one of the intelligent organizations. Even the major coalition partners were oblivious to the decision. This act of government instead of reforming the balance of power equation according to the demands of Charter of Democracy has generated more confusion, skepticism and frustration in the society. Who is responsible for this fiasco, civilian rulers or civil-military bureaucracy?
Presently, the divergence of opinion and rigid attitude of the coalition partners has kept the government in limbo. Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz faction (PML) demands reinstatement of the deposed judges and impeachment of President Pervez Musharraf; whereas Pakistan People Party (PPP) seems confused and indecisive on these issues. Even PPP co-chairman Asif Ali Zardari’s eighteenth amendment bill lost its significance.  Many political analysts expressed their dissatisfaction on the performance of Prime Minister Gilani government and predicted the possibility of change of guards in Islamabad in the near future. If the present ruling elite be failed due to its non-elected advisers and thoughtless decisions, whom one could blame. Certainly intelligence agencies or establishment would be an easy target. It is easy to blame intelligence agencies, especially ISI instead of high lighting the amateurish decision making apparatus of ruling elite and divergence of opinion among the ruling coalition.
Presently, the ISI is under the administrative control of the Prime Minister’s office. For its better functioning it is not a onspiracy to ask for greater accountability of the organization or its’ restructuring. Balanced reforms and amendments in the charter of the institutions or organizational structures have always produced positive outcomes. The reforms which enhance the working efficiency of the organization ought to be recommended and supported. But the reforms, which serve some other purposes, should be condemned and opposed.    
The need of the hour is that we should be careful about the Western and Indian propaganda and try to address the destabilizing challenges carefully—with a ‘nationalistic approach’ rather than being a more ‘internationalist’ in our conclusions. Thus, the sole purpose of restructuring of the intelligence agencies should be to improve the professional performance of these agencies instead of satisfying Washington and New Delhi.