The insurgent supremo in Swat Fazlullah who the security forces claimed was on the run following the liquidation of his power base, silenced critics by proving that he was very much alive and kicking. Addressing a press conference in a remote hilly area he threatened to renew armed action, while he accepted that his men were responsible for destroying more than fifty girl’s schools in the valley. It was the first formal acknowledgement of his linkage with Baitullah Mahsud, and Molvi Muhammad Umar. Ironically he addressed Mullah Umar with great reverence, calling him ‘Amir-ul-Momineen’, (chief of all the Muslims), underlining his commitment to a extra-territorial cause. What he suggested was that all Taliban, whether in Afghanistan or Pakistan were part of a single setup and Mullah Umar was their supreme leader. If Fazlullah and Co. owe allegiance to Mullah Umar it is something more serious than their sharing the Taliban world view. By recognising him as their supreme leader they have clearly brought home the message that they do not accept the territorial boundaries of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
A more dangerous implication of his nexus with Mullah Umar was that Taliban were required not only to fight the Kabul regime aided by NATO forces, but also carry forward their ‘battle against infidels’ into Pakistan. To hard core Taliban there was hardly any difference between the regime in Kabul and the regime in Islamabad --- both are un-Islamic and American satellites. Thus negotiating a truce with Pakistani Taliban could only be tactical manoeuvre since they are not going to opt for a durable peace as long as they do not achieve Talibanisation of the social order in Pakistan.
Whatever makes them so hopeful of their eventual triumph in Pakistan, ideologues of the Pakistani Taliban seem convinced, as one of them said in a TV panel discussion recently that they are likely to take over the government in Islamabad. Through elections they cannot hope to win power as was clearly demonstrated in the 2007 polls when the pro-Taliban political forces were routed in NWFP --- close to there base area in the Tribal Areas, seizing political power by force as they have trying to achieve in Afghanistan is an unlikely thing to happen, since Pakistan Army is a qualitatively different entity from the Kabul troops and the NATO forces a bunch of mercenaries who have no conviction the cause for which they are fighting.
Nonetheless the Pakistan Taliban are not asking for moon when they nourish hopes of seizing political power in Pakistan. It is not as ridiculous a proposition as it appears when we consider the following scenario ---  i) The democratically elected government in Islamabad is quite capable of gross mismanagement leading up to a grave political crises.  ii) An administrative breakdown of the organs of state apparatus cold invite the army to intervene iii) Pro-Taliban element in the army, particularly ISI, would then have a chance to re-assert their line as seeking an alliance with Pakistan Taliban may be handy for the army to win popular support.
Prime Minister Yusuf Reza Gilani told the Americans that there was only a handful of militants who were holding for ransom peace and security of the tribal area. This was under the circumstances a gross ‘understatement’. We cannot sweep under the carpet the growing threat of Taliban activity, accompanied by the ‘Talibanisation’ of more and more areas in the country. And we have to accept the bitter reality that we have failed to isolate or contain the Pakistani Taliban who have since advent of operations against – then grown in numbers and influence. Far from ejecting the hard core from their sanctuaries we have been guilty of allowing them free access to other areas. Things have come to such a pass that we can no longer claim that Islamabad exercises its writ over the tribal areas, for all practical purposes it is a Taliban fiefdom where they call the shots and exercise the facility to hit targets of their own choice in any part of the country. Baitullah Mahsud runs the show in South Wazirastan and couldn’t care less if he was named a suspect in Benazir Bhutto assassination case, and now Fazlullah has reappeared on the scene of action in Swat as if to bring home the message that Swat operation was a shame. Small wonder the day after Fazlullah threatened a tit-for-tat relation, 32 officials were kidnapped by the militants in Swat.
Fazlullah threatening posture should be matter of concern to Islamabad. It is not merely his ability to retaliate that should worry the law enforcing agencies, this has been happening in Swat and elsewhere in and around the tribal belt. Two related question need to be examined closely i) the futility of indecisive military operations ii) Intra-Taliban linkages and alternative sources of support and assistance to militants engaged in a battle in a particular area. Renewal of hostilities in Swat soon after it was believed that the backbone of the gun wieldier has been broken underscores the futility of indecisive or inconclusive military actions. Soon after Fazlullah the so called fugitive declared war on the security forces he and his armed men were able to create such a serious situation that curfew was imposed on the entire Swat district. What was the end result of the so called high profile military operation that lasted for a month one may ask? If the government was under the impression which was in particular the provincial ANP government case that the militants under Fazlullah’s command would be inclined to opt for a negotiated settlement that has not happened, underscoring the fact that inclusive operations are counter-productive. It is either action or talks,  as events have proved that these two do not go together.
That the apparently contained militants have the will and the ability to stage a come back speaks values for their ‘linkages’ which sustain them in hour of adversity. If one were to believe Maulana Fazlullah militants fighting apparently isolated battles in different areas are part of the same ‘network’. All of them may not be fighting under a single command but they are intercalated and inter-dependent. Any attempt to split them and win over one faction is a futile endeavour. Some of them may agree to a truce for tactical reasons but none of them can be used to undermine the other. And of all of them owe allegiance to Amir-ul-Momineen Mullah Umar none of them can be stopped from crossing over to Afghanistan to contribute to main battle field.