Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani’s first official visit to Washington was rather ill timed. It took place at a time when his hosts were highly critical of Islamabad’s role in the coalition for war against terror, and the Pakistani Prime Minister had no explanation, which would satisfy the American reservations. Striking an equation with the democratically elected regime was on Washington agenda but there were many ifs and buts before the two sides confirmed that they were talking on the same wavelength. Although Washington’s ‘trusted friend and ally’, President Musharraf has since been marginalised and new faces have appeared on the political scene to call the shots, President Musharraf’s political future was no-longer a crucial factor in sustaining a modicum of good relation between Washington and Islamabad. No radical changes have since taken place in Pakistan’s foreign policy; on the contrary an effort has been made in Islamabad to maintain the status quo. Rhetoric apart, Musharraf has managed to stick around his job and there is no threat of his exit from the presidency unless the sticky question of judge’s restoration was resolved and Nawaz Sharif and Zardari could gang up together to impeach Musharraf. Thus a measure of continuity in the functioning of the foreign office has been the highlight of Gilani’s first 100 days in office, which should be a matter of some consolation for the Americans.
The core issue of contention between Washington and Islamabad has been in question of dealing with Pakistan Taliban. The American grouse has been loud and clear. Islamabad has been charged with not doing enough to combat the militants, particularly in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan. American sources have been alleging that Al-Qaeda and hardcore Taliban leaders were regrouping in their sanctuaries in the Tribal Areas for another big attack against them which they say poses a serious security threat and thus a matter of great concern to them. What the Americans have been constantly advising Islamabad is to launch a full-scale military operation against the warring tribals, in particular against the safe havens being used by the militant for operations against coalition forces in Afghanistan. Thus there is no room for negotiation with the militants in the American scheme of things. The American are alarmed when they hear Islamabad saying that its first preference is a negotiated settlement of whatever differences there were with the tribal militants. We will deal with the Pakistani Taliban in our own way is a prescription not acceptable to the Americans who smell a rat in the design for containing the militants rather than fighting them. Prime Minister Gilani has had the onus of selling a prescription, which the American see as a sell out of war against terror.
Prime Minister Gilani must have been tutored by the Foreign Office to live up to the ‘big occasion’ -- his first encounter with G. W. Bush even though Gilani’s capacity to articulate the Pakistani case was rather limited, particularly in comparison to president Musharraf who has been dealing with the Americans for several years. Nevertheless he could have followed the prepared script which required him to convey to the Americans the all important message that Pakistan will not allow foreign troops to enter Pakistan territory to undertake any military action against the Pakistan Taliban which was exclusively Pakistan’s domestic affair. He could have also told President Bush that Pakistan was not promoting their cause by talking to the Taliban since only those militants will benefit from a truce who were prepared to surrender their arms. Hopefully Gilani has reassured President Bush that fighting terrorism was Pakistan’s own war of national survival and the American had reason to suspect Pakistan’s intentions. You must trust your allies, he could have said, and have faith in Pakistan’s capability to fight international terrorism as best as other allies in the coalition. And as far as infiltration of terrorists to Afghanistan was concerned Washington could be asked to mediate a joint Pak-Afghan endeavour to control it.
As was expected the face-to-face meeting between Bush and Gilani did not produce any significant result as was evidenced by the joint press conference. The two sides tried to de-emphasise the differences and focus on their principled commitment to carry forward the goal of war against terrorism underling their common cause and the alliance to achieve it. However, what caused great embarrassment to the visiting Pakistan Prime Minister was Islamabad’s U-turn within 24-hours over transfer of ISI’s control to the Interior Ministry. If the earlier notification was meant to convey to the Americans on the eve of Bush-Gilani meeting that the civilian authority in Islamabad has established its writ over all the organs of state power, in particular the armed forces, the move has backfired. The bottom line of Gilani’s appeal to Bush – don’t act unilaterally.