The visit of Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gillani to the United States comes at a bewildering time in the history of the relationship of the two countries. Although, much is expected out of the voyage to Washington, it is hard to see much coming right for Pakistan. The news agencies across the world were already predicting that the Pakistani PM would be grilled over his government’s inability to deal with the problem of religious extremism and terrorism in the Pakistani areas bordering Afghanistan.
Reports suggest that the prime minister is in Washington for talks with his American counterpart on, among other issues, reform of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, which is widely perceived in the US as having ‘a mind of its own’, when it comes to tackling the Taliban and the militancy.
In a press conference alongside Bush on the South Lawn of the White House, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani on last Monday said extremists in the region are small in number, but pose a serious threat to Pakistan. He also said most Pakistanis want peace and support the United States. “This is our own war,” Gilani said. “This is a war which is against Pakistan.” Similarly, President Bush lauded the efforts of Pakistan in the war against terror as well as the new prime minister’s “strong commitment” to battle terrorists.
Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani though carries a strong political background at home lacks the charisma and appeal matching a strong international leader something that was a hall mark of the late Benazir Bhutto. He in his talks with the US President George W. Bush called on the United States not to act “unilaterally” against militants in Pakistan, that under the present circumstances sounds less of a warning and more of a request and appeal.
Critics are finding little change in terms of our strategy in defending our national interest. The fundamental criticism against President Musharraf has been his inability to win hearts and minds at home in his effort to salvage the same abroad, but the dilemma seemingly facing the present set up is turning out to be worst with the economic crisis deepening, security situation worsening and opposition parties and lawyers still protesting for judges restoration and the US and the West still rapping ‘do more’, there is little that one can hope for, for peace, prosperity and stronger as well as independent international role.
Pakistan in this war on terror has played its part in arresting many al-Qaeda operatives. Yet fingers are still pointed at Pakistan, most recently by Afghan President Hamid Karzai. This bitter blame-game has intensified in the recent period.
Many believe that under the prevailing circumstances the gainers are only the Taliban and al-Qaeda who are increasingly cementing their position in the tribal areas.
Analysts say that ever since Pakistan signed onto the United States’ “war on terror” in 2001, Washington has adopted a carrot-and-stick approach in an attempt to prod its ‘reluctant partner’.
The situation and the strategy adopted is paying none of the two ‘unwilling’ allies…the US-led forces are losing the war in Afghanistan and failing to curb unrest in Iraq, similarly Pakistan has lost its writ over parts of the country, especially in the tribal areas.
Ever since the September 11 attacks, Musharraf government has been able to maintain, for the most part, a positive relationship with the US as its frontline ally. Musharraf government was able to acquire legitimacy for many of its actions from Washington – something the retired general dearly lacked on domestic front.
The situation for the present government, however, is much different. In the last few months, the relationship between the two allies in the War on Terror has been marked by skepticism more than anything else. Various policy-making quarters in the United States have not only questioned the Pakistani approach to the resolution of the problem, but have time and again accused Pakistan of appeasing, and even backing the militants.
The roller-coaster relationship touched a new low when the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, threatened Pakistan of ‘hot pursuit’ of terrorists inside Pakistan. Islamabad could see the change in the air from Washington – that honestly is not something Pakistani governments and people are not used to. The visiting prime minister would feel the heat of a changing US tenor towards all-things Pakistan.
The problem does not end there. The US presidential elections would be held in November this year. This means that while Gilani would have to take the strain of responding to the agonising doubts over his government’s approach towards the problem, he may not be able to score many points that would count in the future with the new American administration headed by either Obama or McCain. Although, it is hard to imagine that the approach of the new administration would be drastically different from that of the Bush administration, some changes are warranted due to the growing unpopularity of the Bush administration’s War on Terror.
In the midst of the entire thrashing that Pakistan receives in the United States for its ineffective counterterrorism policy, the grounds for such ineffectiveness are conveniently overlooked. Many in the United States fail to come to terms with the reality that the perception regarding Pakistan’s approach has been grossly oversimplified.
Behaving like a classical imperial state, the United States has different choices to make when it frames it counterterrorism strategy. The actions and statements emanating from the powerhouses in Washington suggest that the elevated ideals that the United States so dearly upholds and promotes can be enforced upon an unwilling population. The policy-makers’ only cause for concern might be the number of casualties from the front – those too of the American soldiers and civilians. The war tactics in the last 6 years have revealed that often the decision-makers in the US would not give an attack a second thought that may amount to the civilian casualties in the area under attack.
Fighting militants domestically is a lot different though. Domestically, a country cannot leave the mess that it creates, which is something that the United States has a history of doing. The use of force might be the first option for the United States in dealing with militants across the globe; for Pakistan, though, it has to be the last alternative. Besides, the use of force has rarely been much useful for the United States itself.
The dominant perception across the media in the United States has been that Gilani must have faced tough time answering queries regarding the deal that the Pakistani government is pursuing to chalk out with the militants. This more or less goes on to suggest that the United States government wants Pakistan to give up the more domestically feasible alternatives untried.
Mr. Gillani was justified in stating that the war is our own war – actually, it would have been more appropriate to say that it is our war and we should be left to fight it our way. He should have been more assertive in disproving the accusations from the Afghan President Hamid Karzai. He should have also highlighted the fact that such an attitude from an internally weak Afghan government will only make it tough for Pakistan to create goodwill for Afghanistan’s cause in Pakistan. It does not make sense to develop a hate-relationship with a country and still expect it stands by you in tough times.
Rhetorical as it is, the positive that came out of the meeting was the pledge of American President to support democracy and sovereignty of Pakistan. It might constitute wishful thinking, but it is no crime hoping that it would mean that the United States would not support unrepresentative and non-elected government in Pakistan. It may even mean that the days for Musharraf have been counted, and he may have to come up with an exit strategy of his own.
The US president’s statement regarding the support to Pakistan’s sovereignty should put the speculations regarding a US attack on Pakistani areas to rest for the time being at least. It should, however, also go beyond the attack and the United States should also respect the sovereignty of Pakistani nation with regard to policymaking, particularly the counterterrorism policy.
The United States should also show more awareness of the multifarious problems Pakistan is facing at this point in time. While the counterterrorism struggle might be at the top of the US agenda, Pakistani government has much more on its hands. The cooperation between the two states, therefore, should not only be the areas concerning the United States. The US should also support Pakistan in dealing with the domestic issues at hand. The biggest help from the United States at the moment, however, is its support to the democratically elected governments.
