We have been guilty of underrating the strength and influence of Pakistani Taliban. There are only a handful of miscreants who are holding to ransom the tribal people, President Musharraf use to tell the Americans who believed him for a while. But instead of isolating the so-called ‘terrorists’, our security operations encountered more and stiffer resistance from people in areas, which were considered safe. If at one time there were pockets, which could be called Taliban hideouts, it appears that virtually the entire tribal belt has now been turned into a safe haven for Pakistani Taliban. It is futile to single-out Baitullah Mehsud as the villain of peace in counter-insurgency. There are now scores of militant bosses who hold the gun and are prepared to use it against Pakistani security forces.
What has gone wrong is anybody’s guess, but we have miserably failed to ‘win the minds and hearts’ of the tribal people, and added to the list of our enemies rather than winning friends. The ‘handful of terrorists’ who we wanted to dislodge from their sanctuaries have spread to other areas raising the banner of revolt. At one time, one would have thought that conflict area was confined to North and South Waziristan, then came the rebellion in Swat and now the Khyber Agency has fallen to the militants. There must have been something terribly wrong with our policy vis-à-vis the tribal areas, or was it a matter of not executing it correctly. On the face of it, one could not pinpoint a flow in the broad of objectives of the government envisaged to do in the tribal areas. Islamabad did not at any stage advocate an all out attack against the Pakistani Taliban. On the contrary, Musharraf said that we should not brand every Taliban a ‘terrorist’, but clearly differentiate ‘hard core gun wielder’, and their friends or allies. The majority of pro-Taliban elements should be won over and not attacked.
Islamabad’s policy could be described as a combination of ‘containment and engagement’. Scores of initiatives were taken to talk to the militants, but each time accord was concluded, it fell through soon after military actions were also resume since they did not lead to durable peace. Thus one was prompted to say that both options failed to deliver. The end result of whatever policy we have pursued was disaster -- total chaos and unrest in the tribal areas and the alienation of our so-called allies in war against terror. There is not a day when security forces are not attacked by militants in one or the other area of the tribal belt, even though there have been countless ‘jirgas’ for mediation. The Americans have been highly displeased with our performance, insisting time and again that Pakistan must do more to meet their requirement of an efficacious war against terrorism, and Kabul has been charging Islamabad with allowing Taliban to cross into Afghanistan for terrorists’ actions.
No dramatic changes were expected in Islamabad on any of the major foreign policy issues, the least effected being the perspective on tribal areas, since the installation of the PPP-led government. In fact this is what has actually happened the only shift being emphasis on negotiations with the militant. There is nothing new in the policy of opting for a negotiated settlement with the militants and resorting to military action as the lost resort. Whatever may have been course of negotiations since the new government took office there has been continuity in approach. We will talk to only those militants who lay down their arms, has been the official stance. But there has been as much of action as were the indecisive negotiations. Talking to the militants is indeed an uphill task, which requires the patience of a Buddhist monk to move forward. Nothing has succeeded so far; barring an uneasy peace in Swat while the security forces are still deployed there.
Needless to say the Americans are highly critical of Islamabad holding talks with the Pakistani Taliban. It is a deviation which the coalition can ill afford, they say, since any respite for militants is not acceptable to them, more so because it may lead to regrouping of the militant elements. In Kabul’s perception negotiations with militants imply deliberate connivance. It has also been alleging that Islamabad has been pursuing a policy of duplicity. There are elements with a Pakistan administrant who do not want confrontation with the Taliban and are reluctant to take effective steps that could stop their outflow across the Durand Line. While the Nato commanders, seem to be in a hurry to act and act decisively, the Americans have told Islamabad that there was a consensus among the US leadership that Islamabad must launch an all out military action against militants in the Tribal Areas. Needless to say that the American are no longer prepared to accept the Pakistani prescription for containing the Pakistani Taliban -- we will do it in our own way is a counterproductive approach, they insist.
In the wake of a growing controversy between the American line -- ‘It is not enough’ and Pakistan’s response ‘We will do it in our own way’, it may be necessary to examine the merit o the Pakistani case. If the two allies are not working at cross purposes and both of them mean the same thing, when they call for decisive battle against terrorism, one has to see to what extent the Pakistan dual policy of ‘engagement and containment’ will meet declared objectives of the coalition. Is it possible to achieve through a negotiated settlement the eviction of hardcore fighters from their sanctuaries, or stop their infiltration to Afghan territory? Why could the Taliban sign their own death warrant is a million dollar question. If the American design is to ‘liquidate’ the Taliban from the Tribal Areas, Islamabad’s insistence on negotiation with the militant will not achieve the purpose. The Pakistani Taliban are a political reality who cannot be sold a package of ‘peace, autonomy and development’ to make them surrender. Some critics may suggest then why should Islamabad not accept the American advice and opt for a military operation to the finish. But if we examine post occupation Iraq and the performance of the Nato forces in Afghanistan we will inevitably reach the conclusion that following the American model may well be a more disastrous course of action.
Political pundits discount the possibility of American intervention in the Tribal Areas, but subscribe to view that Nato forces may be deployed close to the Pakistani border and occasional intrusion could be made to hit targets in the Tribal Areas. The real purpose of raising noises in Washington is to put maximum pressure on Islamabad to reverse its policy holding talks with the Pakistani Taliban. Meanwhile, Islamabad is caught in a dilemma -- indecision and inaction torn between the urge to talk or to attack. It is a delicate balancing act that we have been trying to perform, but unfortunately neither of the two options, we have been exercising from time to time has paid any dividend.