Iran’s nuclear programme has been under intense scrutiny from the United States and its like-minded states since the past several years. The Bush Administration and Israelis believe that Tehran kept clandestine nuclear weapons programme, which has the potential to unleash nuclear arms race in the Middle East. These perceptions are acceptable due to Iran’s uranium enrichment programme, which can produce the fuel needed to make nuclear bombs.
President Bush bracketed Iran as a member of the “Axis of Evil” in January 2002. Since then, Washington has been pressurising Iranian ruling elite to cap and roll back its nuclear enrichment programme. Washington also managed to vote for three United Nations Security Council Resolutions demanding Tehran to cease its nuclear enrichment activities. On the other hand, Iran maintains that it has a right to peaceful use of nuclear technology under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. It will not give up its nuclear enrichment activity, which is only for peaceful purposes.      
Although the American National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) affirmed in December 2007 that Iran has no nuclear weapons, and had closed down its programme to develop a nuclear weapons capability in 2003, but Tel Aviv while rejecting the findings of NIE claimed that Tehran had continued its uranium enrichment and also recommended military strikes for addressing the Iranian nuclear imbroglio instead of six parties’ talks for refraining it from the development of nuclear weapons.
The Persian Gulf’s strategic environment, increasing anti-Americanism in the Muslim World; longevity of war on terrorism, the strategic convergence between Beijing and Moscow and above all the recent unprecedented increase in the oil prices discouraged Washington to launch a new military operation in the region against Tehran. The Americans’ reluctance to use its military might against Iran have frustrating impact on the hawks in the Tel Aviv.  
Israel’s insecurity multiplied when Iran tested a number of ballistic missiles, including one — Shahab-3, which has the ability to carry a nuclear weapon and the range to strike Israel, on July 9, 2008. Many strategic analysts pointed out that Shahab-3 lacks a proper guidance system, and probably could not penetrate Israel’s anti-ballistic missile defenses. The Israel’s arrow anti-ballistic missile system is a reproduction of United States Patriot Defensive Missile Systems. Despite these technological advantages, Israelis feel threatened and are doing their best to limit Iran’s missile and nuclear programmes.
Importantly, Israel could not act alone in clipping Iran’s military power despite its air force exercises last month in Iraq. It is an open secret that Israel requires United States’ support for its preventive pre-emptive military strikes against Iran. Moreover, senior United States defense officials pointed out that a much-anticipated Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities would fail to destroy them due to lack of intelligence about their location. The strategic estimates indicate that even United States requires numerous military strikes to damage a fraction of Iranian nuclear infrastructure. The recent Iranian missiles tests and its ruling elite’s statements manifest that Tehran would retaliate to military adventurism against its nuclear facilities. Thus, this military action-reaction would further destabilise the strategic environment of the already volatile region.
Iran’s missile tests also attracted the United States presidential candidates’ attention. Both Barack Obama and John McCain reacted strongly, but with different approaches to resolve the Iranian military buildup issue. The former stated that Iran’s missile tests highlighted the need for direct diplomacy as well as tougher threats of economic sanctions and strong incentives to persuade Tehran to change its behaviour, whereas, the former recommended for effective missile defense, including missile defense in Europe and the defense system the United States plans with the Czech Republic and Poland.
Senator Obama’s approach, i.e. ‘engage and contain’, seems rational and practical. It gives the State Department an opportunity to start confidence-building process with Tehran. Engaging Tehran directly on numerous conflicting issues certainly provide a chance to replace enmity with amity. It would not only increase the confidence of Iran, but also increase Washington’s power to influence, which was severely limited due to the absence of diplomatic relations between the two states. Notably, Washington and Tehran have not had diplomatic relations since the hostage crisis at the US Embassy in Tehran after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran.
Last month, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany offered a package of political, security and economic incentives in exchange for Tehran freezing its nuclear activity. The package of incentives was accompanied by a letter from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the foreign ministers of the other five countries and sets out a scenario in which Iran would get a temporary reprieve from economic and financial sanctions in exchange for freezing its enrichment activities.
In the recent talks on Iran’s nuclear issue in Geneva, Washington’s decision to send a senior American official — Under Secretary of State William Burns — to participate in international talks to resolve the impasse over Iran’s nuclear programme generated optimism about possible compromise on formula under which Iran would agree to stop expanding its enrichment activities in particular, and also raised expectations of a positive swing in Tehran-Washington three decade belligerent relations in general.
Mr William Burns’ presence at the talks on July 19 sent a message that Washington was serious in its search for a diplomatic solution to the problem. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki termed United States participation in the talks as ‘a new positive approach’. Mr Saeed Jalili, Iranian representative also stated, “If they (the US) enter (negotiations) with a constructive approach and by avoiding previous mistakes, we can definitely have good and constructive negotiations.” Similarly, the modification in the Washington’s previous stance —there would be no contact until uranium enrichment is suspended — would have positive impact on the six nations dialogue with Iran. It was reported that during the Geneva talks the six nations representative diplomats presented a “freeze-for-freeze” formula wherein Iran is expected to freeze its uranium enrichment programme at its current level and Western nations will end all sanctions on Tehran.
The optimism, however, dashed when the Iranian representative Saeed Jalili reiterated in Geneva that Tehran had no plans to stop enriching uranium — the key demand of the United States and its like-minded states. In a reaction, once again Washington repeated its previous stance and asked Iran to decide between cooperation and confrontation over its nuclear programme within two weeks. The United States, Department of State spokesperson Sean McCormack said in a statement, “We hope the Iranian people understand that their leaders need to make a choice between co-operation, which would bring benefits to all, and confrontation, which can only lead to further isolation.”
The critical evaluation of the Persian Gulf strategic environment exhibits that military adventurism against Iran would have serious repercussions; therefore, both sides should act rationally and opt a diplomatic solution to the problem. More precisely, if Washington remains committed with engage and contain policy, it would have a positive outcome.