The domestic nuclear commercial lobby succeeded in amending the nuclear export laws of the United States. The new format of Agreement 123 would facilitate nuclear trade with the recipient India. Simultaneously, it challenges Washington’s traditional nuclear non-proliferation policy and wear away international consensus for curbing nuclear weapons proliferation.
The basis of nuclear cooperation between India and the United States were agreed on July 18, 2005. Since then, the Washington and New Delhi have been inching towards the nuclear deal’s accomplishment. The situation became advantageous for India once the United States House of Representative and Senate approved the deal with overwhelming votes of endorsement. The execution of Agreement 123 would not only boost Indian nuclear infrastructure, but also end the ambiguity about its nuclear status and concede its rightful place in the international nuclear pantheon.
The deal was absolutely endorsed by the United States Congress. It was, however, questioned by the Left Front, a coalition partner of the PM Singh government, and also severely criticised by the opposition party BJP in Lok Sabha. The BJP categorically stated that if India sign this agreement, it accept the Hyde Act, which imposes a constraint on New Delhi’s strategic options in the nuclear field. The Left Parties opined that the deal would mean that American imperialism was going to decide India’s foreign policy.
Presently, the Bush Administration seems in a rush to sell India nuclear technology and fuel. It wants finalisation of deal, before it leaves office in January 2009. The Indian ruling Congress party is equally enthusiastic to operationalise the deal. In this context, both sides have to make quick decisions, because the United States Congress is scheduled to adjourn for the next year on September 26, 2008. And its final approval of Indo-US 123 Agreement is awaited. Conversely, the Left Front members of United Progressive Alliance remained indifferent to the deal. They tried to hinder the passage of the bill in the Lok Sabha. While realising that Congress had decided to accomplish the deal, Left Front announced its withdrawal from the ruling United Progressive Alliance.
The general impression was that these parties support for the survival of United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government was essential. But the recent developments in the Delhi political circles undermined the significance of these parties’ opposition to the Indo-US nuclear deal. The Samajwadi Party, for example, decided to support the nuclear deal in the Lok Sabha. In addition to Samajwadi Party, the Congress succeeded in securing support from other small political parties in the Lok Sabha as well.
The preceding discussion proves that the recent negotiations between President Bush and PM Singh to implement the Indo-US nuclear dead did not cause major political upheaval in New Delhi. The UPA government on July 11 recommended President Pratibha Patil to convene a special session of the Lok Sabha on July 21 and 22 to enable it to seek a vote of confidence. Consequently, the deal would get approved by majority vote in the Indian parliament on July 22, 2008.
Importantly, besides the Indian parliament and American Congress’s approval two international organisations -- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and 45-nation Nuclear Supplier Groups -- decisions on the Indo-US nuclear deal would be imperative. The IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) have a duty to weigh the risk of nuclear proliferation before sanctioning the deal. Both the organisations have to take into account that India is a nuclear maverick. It has an impressive nuclear infrastructure, but does not adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. New Delhi built its first bomb in 1974 by misusing Canadian and American civilian nuclear technological assistance. The CIRUS reactor was built by Canada, and its nuclear fuel was supplied by the United States. The understanding between the supplier states and recipient India was that the latter would not use the CIRUS for military purposes. Nevertheless, New Delhi violated the agreement and diverted plutonium from the CIRUS reactor for manufacturing and testing nuclear device on May 18, 1974.
The Bush Administration’s inclination towards India has compelled Arms control experts to change their stance on nuclear nonproliferation, while dealing with New Delhi. Instead of demanding India’s nuclear weapons programme elimination prior to the transfer of nuclear technology and fuel, they are urging the IAEA and NSG to make any co-operation conditional on a commitment from India that it will not test any more bombs. India has been observing voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing since May 1998. But it had categorically refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, outlawing nuclear tests.
The Singh government approached the IAEA board of governors. The press reports indicate that IAEA would accommodate India. Theoretically, it is difficult for the NSG to approve the Indo-US nuclear deal. The NSG needs to amend its existing export control list. Even a single vote could kill the amendment resolution. The Americans, however, have been lobbying to amend NSG laws during its forthcoming meeting in September 2008.
Since 1974, Canada refused to sell India nuclear technology and fuel. The Bush Administration’s decision to sell India nuclear technology and fuel brought a change in the three decade Canadian nuclear policy vis-à-vis India. In 2005, Paul Martin's Liberal government reversed course and agreed to re-establish nuclear co-operation with India. The decision of Canadian government marked that in addition to the United States, other major nuclear supplier states would heavily invest in the Indian nuclear sector.
The implementation of Indo-US nuclear deal would open a floodgate to nuclear technology and fuel transfers resulting in rewriting the norms of nuclear nonproliferation regime. The NSG transfer nuclear technology to recipient states without ensuring the comprehensive safeguards of the IAEA would facilitate potential nuclear proliferators in manufacturing their nuclear devices. More precisely, this trend would unleash nuclear weapons proliferation.
