Since the mid-twentieth century nuclear weapons have been the currency of power in a world of unequal states. The nuclear weapon states have been modernising their nuclear weapons, and the demand for these lethal arms has been increasing in the Persian Gulf and the Korean peninsula. Nuclear deterrence is viewed as an important component of solidifying defensive fence in an anarchical society. Nobody can dispute the significance of nuclear weapons in the prevalent global strategic environment; therefore nuclear disarmament seems more of wishful thinking in the near future.
The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) had worked in controlling horizontal proliferation during the cold war. The treaty, however, has failed to disarm its nuclear-armed members and was unsuccessful in preventing the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. For instance, the most important NPT provision that has not been well observed is Article VI, the obligation of the five nuclear-weapon states, (which tested nuclear weapons prior to January1, 1967) “to negotiate in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early day and to nuclear disarmament.” The non-implementation of Article VI prompts non-nuclear weapons states to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities for guarding their sovereign existence.
The sole super power’s nuclear planning enhances the significance of nuclear weapons and indicate that nuclear proliferation will continue in the years to come. The Bush Administration has blocked progress on nuclear disarmament. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was abrogated and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty disarmament process was abandoned. The Americans have continued research and development to upgrade their nuclear weapons despite the end of Cold War and the demise of former Soviet Union. During the Rumsfeld-era, for example, Pentagon lobbied for a new generation of more usable nuclear weapons, like earth penetrators to go after buried caches of those elusive weapons of mass destruction and low-yield weapons. Recently, United States Department of Energy initiated a debate on its plan to modernise the laboratories and factories where the United States designs, builds, and maintain nuclear weapons. The purpose behind these plans is to retain the United States’ dominance in nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future, with the ability to expand production capacity and to design and deploy new kinds of nuclear weapons if desired.
Admittedly, in the early 1990s the nuclear abolitionist movements received serious attention from the nuclear weapon states, but gradually they lost their significance, particularly after the United States’ Senate’s refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in October 1999 and its decision to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty on December 13, 2001. The Bush administration also deviated from the consensus document of Conference on Disarmament on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Thus, the current US policies run directly counter to the full implementation of the thirteen practical steps it and other nuclear weapon states agreed to, during the NPT Review Conference held in 2000, as well as to its obligations under Article VI of the NPT to work for the elimination of nuclear weapons.
In addition, the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons further undermined the credibility of nuclear non-proliferation regime and reconfirmed the vitality of nuclear weapons in the strategic realm. Israel secretly tested its nuclear weapon in late 1970s. Tel Aviv has not clarified its nuclear status, but it is an open secret that Israel possesses remarkable nuclear armoury. India and Pakistan did nuclear weapon tests in May 1998 and North Korea conducted under ground nuclear explosion on October 9, 2006 in pursuit of its ambition to become a nuclear weapon state. Years of negotiations—six party talks between North Korea, China, Japan, Russian Federation, South Korea and United States—to stop North Korean nuclear weapons program failed to accomplish desired objectives. The United States and its like-minded states have firm belief that Iran possesses clandestine nuclear weapons programme. Though Tehran has categorically denied these allegations, but failed to satisfy the International Atomic Energy Agency and the concerned states. If Iran manufactures a nuclear weapon, it would unleash nuclear arms race in the Persian Gulf in particular and Middle East in general.
Importantly, the Western countries have accepted the nuclearisation of India, but they have failed to realise the vitality of nuclear deterrence for Pakistan’s sovereign defence. They are keen to cooperate with New Delhi in modernising its nuclear infrastructure. The United States agreed to lift a ban on civilian nuclear technology sales to nuclear-armed India, despite its refusal to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty or give up its nuclear arms. The Indo-US nuclear deal certainly, boost Indian nuclear programme. Simultaneously, these states have been compelling Islamabad to cap, roll back and finally end its nuclear weapons capabilities. Whereas, the strategic environment of South Asia necessitate that Islamabad should preserve its credible minimum nuclear deterrence.
For several years, arms control diplomacy had tried to prevent both horizontal as well as vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. But the significance of these weapons in the strategic and political calculations of nuclear weapons states has frustrated nuclear abolitionists’ efforts for complete nuclear disarmament. The current trends in the global politics indicate that the desire for nuclear weapons is on the upsurge; thereby the domino theory of the 21st century may well be nuclear.
