The almost inconceivable state of affairs leading to the operation in Khyber Agency has once again left the more sensible section of our population in bewilderment. Although we have grown somewhat at home with the charged centrality of the militancy and the counter-militancy in the daily news coverage, the spread of the saga to another region is hard to make sense of.
Measured against most analytical touchstones, Khyber Agency would be the most important among the seven agencies neighbouring the NWFP. Ever since the situation in the rest of areas constituting FATA has gone out of hand, the importance of Khyber Agency has touched new heights. Most of the transit trade to Afghanistan has to go through the agency, as the situation in the other areas neighbouring Afghanistan does not allow the passage. It is next door to the provincial capital and one of the more important cities of the country – Peshawar. The undesirable consequences of losing the agency to turmoil, in view of all this, are not so hard to imagine.
The writ of the government, we are told and we do not object to, is to be maintained. The leading religious group of the area, Lashkar-i-Islam, had initiated a campaign of moral policing that went beyond the boundaries of the agency. The administration in Islamabad speaks upliftingly about the restoration of order to the region. While no one with a degree of level-headedness can disagree with the desirability of such an end, the policy to achieve it can generate disagreements.
More than anything else the timing of the operation in the agency has to be questioned. The government had more than enough challenges lying in front of it that should have prevented it from involving in a new adventure. The judges’ question is still longing for an answer. It divides the opinions not only among the opposition partners but even within the ruling PPP. Economy frustrates the common man on a daily basis. Inflation has touched unmatched levels. And as if all this is not enough, we are already engaged on more than one front against the militants in the tribal areas.
The only reason that could induce us to open another front could be the urgency of the situation. The question, therefore, in front of us to analyse is whether the situation in the agency had reached a level that would compel the government to embark upon an operation against the Lashkar-i-Islam. Our contention, however, is that the operation is ill-timed.
Lashkar-i-Islam is headed by Mangal Bagh, who is different from the leaders of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in many ways. Ever since, he had taken the de facto control of the region, the organisation had never harmed government installations, at least not in a substantial manner. Even the government radio channels were still operating in the area like they previously did – though in a restricted manner. The incidence of the activists of the organisations attacking the personnel of government law-enforcing agencies were also few and far between.
The agency was violently divided on sectarian lines even before the formation of the organisation. The Barelvi Pir Group headed by Pir Saifur Rehman and the Deobandi Mufti Group headed by the controversial Mufti Munir were playing havoc with the harmony in the region. The administration in the agency was already finding itself hopeless in the situation. The emergence of Lashkar-i-Islam was again bolstered by religion slogans. However, we have to acknowledge the fact that religion cannot be excluded from the equation in the tribal areas in any way. Nevertheless, the Lashkar was able to restore a degree of order to the agency that was hard to find for quite a while.
The principal reason for which the government should have exhibited some restraint at the moment is the attitude of Mangal Bagh and his organisation towards the Tehrik-i-Taliban. Earlier this year when Taliban planned to get hold of Khyber Agency and dozens of Taliban activists entered the region, Mangal Bagh was quick to remind them that he calls the shots in the area. Taliban were asked to either leave the agency or lay down their arms and scatter in the hujras around the agency. Such anticipatory actions on behalf of Lashkar-i-Islam effectively reduced the chances of Taliban taking over the agency, which would have been cataclysmic.
Whereas many people may think that the control of the agency by the Lashkar-i-Islam is the comparable to the rise to power of Tehrik-i-Taliban in the region, the facts on the ground might be a lot different. Lashkar-i-Islam has been a little less ambitious and a lot less brutal than the Taliban. Despite the fact that incursions by the organisation in Peshawar had started, the Lashkar remained a regional organisation limited to the Khyber Agency. Its activists are less motivated and its views are more inclusive.
The organisation is local in nature and therefore enjoys substantial local support. Mangal Bagh himself belongs to the Afridi sub-tribe of Sippah. He also had the support of certain other sub-tribal groups like Qamber Khel and to a smaller degree of Malik Deen Khel tribe. The support in the tribal structure does not always mean a one-sided approval of the policies of the organisation. Instead and more importantly, it meant that these tribal groups were able to exercise their influence on the decision-making in the organisation. On the other hand, most of the Koki Khel tribe did not conform to the activities of the organisation. However, the reaction of Lashkar-i-Islam to disagreement has never been as atrocious as it has been the case with the Taliban.
The problem with initiating an operation in the region at this point in time is that it has opened the agency to the admission of Taliban. Taliban have time and again proved to be less accommodating. Their introduction in this most important tribal area would mean the proliferation of the militant problem to a whole new level. Lashkar-i-Islam could have been used as a counterbalance against the influence of Taliban in the region.
Saying that the operation was badly timed, one appears to be playing the devil’s advocate. However, it is imperative for us to understand that we should undertake one venture at a time. The situation is much more complex than it seems at first. Categorising all the movements and organisations in a similar fashion and strategising similarly in regard to them imperils not only peace in the country but also endangers the process of reducing the extremism in the country.
The integration of the tribal areas into the federation should be at the top of the political preferences. However, the time demands us to deal with the more imminent problems at hand at first. The process of integration would work best if it is backed by legal reforms and the creation of stakes of the people of those areas in the federation of Pakistan. Those aware of the realities of the region have been warning that assaulting the area in the hope of uprooting militancy will in all likelihood prove counterproductive.