The initial reaction by the political parties vis-à-vis army action in the tribal belt to suppress Taliban militancy is not encouraging for Islamabad. The situation can be seen in contrast to the move by Taliban who, upon entering of the paramilitary forces into Khyber Agency, scrapped Swat deal with the NWFP government and threatened to extend their war to Sindh and Punjab.
The Musharraf-led political setup stopped military operation against Taliban half-way due to lack of political consensus. The centrist parties danced in streets to get their exiled leadership return home and participate in the general elections while the MMA government in NWFP termed operation against Taliban as a war against one’s own people, that too at the behest of the infidels.
So, the peace agreements were signed in 2006 with the local groups to swap prisoners and establish peace in the region. However, order became a distinct entity due to sporadic violent outbursts, the parties blaming one another for violating the agreement.
Islamabad’s confrontation with Taliban began with its decision to become a frontline state in the war on terror. The US-led military assault ended student militia (leadership trained in Pakistani madarassahs) control over two-third of Afghanistan. Pakistan’s role in this war was crucial as it provided airbases and extended logistic support to the US.
By joining the war on terror, Pakistan gave a pledge to dismantle Al-Qaeda network in its tribal belt that had played a crucial role, first in resisting Soviet forces and then in helping Taliban to establish their writ in Afghanistan.
To uproot militancy on its side, Pakistan announced amenity for its citizens who had been part of the Taliban movement in the past and asked them to expel foreigners, mostly the Central Asians and Arabs, who had been staying in the Fata region since the 1980s with an objective to take part in jihad against the Soviet forces occupying Afghanistan.
Pakistan moved its army into the Fata to implement its plan but it backfired. The Al-Qaeda men were able to garner support of the families in which they had married. Many fierce engagements with army resulted into heavy losses on both sides. But it was not until 2006 when Pakistan recognized that it was confronting with Taliban, not the scattered groups instigated by the Al-Qaeda elements. Such recognition resulted into a number of agreements to swap prisoners.
Until 2006, the US and its allies did support Pakistan’s action against Al-Qaeda and remained appreciative of its role in war on terror. However, its pacts with Taliban alerted Washington where impression got strong that the move had provided Taliban the opportunity to focus on attacking coalition forces (ISAF and NATO) inside Afghanistan.
Reports appeared in the western press linking the upsurge of violence in Afghanistan with the Pak-Taliban peace agreements urging the US and allies to exert pressure on their frontline ally to rein in militants on its side of the border and ensure that they didn’t infiltrate into the neighbouring country.
Differences have persisted between Pakistan and the US over the matter of dealing with the Taliban since then. More Pakistan has insisted on engaging Taliban as a measure to isolate Al-Qaeda and ensure peace of its own land, more the strategic allies have suspected its ability to end militancy on its side. And many a times Pakistan has assaulted militants’ hideouts to dispel such impression.
Pakistan’s hesitance vis-à-vis taking action against Taliban rests in the fear that it will pit the army against its own population and fuel anti-Islamabad sentiments in the NWFP. It is what that has made the decision-makers distinguish between the foreigners and locals. They are clear in the matter of dealing with the Al-Qaeda by which they mean the organization run by Arabs and Central Asians but ready to resist any move against the Taliban.
It is unfortunate that Pakistan’s soft corner towards local Taliban has only encouraged them to excel in perpetrating violence against their own people. Many groups have emerged to claim sovereignty in different areas challenging the writ of the state. They have successfully sneaked into traditionally peaceful valley of Swat making the NWFP government release Sufi Mohammad who rebelled in early 1990s to impose Shariah in the Malakand Division.
Very recently the NWFP government signed a peace deal with the Taliban agreeing to enforce Shariah in the Malakand division and releasing the members of the movement detained for committing as heinous crimes as murder, arson, attack on government officials and blowing up of schools and shops. All was done with the tacit support of Islamabad.
The government appears serious in restoring its writ in the areas adjoining Afghanistan. The operation against militants will provide it opportunity to earn the goodwill of the local population that has been subjected to anarchy and disorder for so long. The US, too, is worried about the growing militancy in the region which it believes has fall outs for Afghanistan. Taliban’s incursions into the settled districts must also have forced the ANP government to distinguish between nationalism and militancy.
The persisting dilemma the government is confronting is that it does not want to pit its army against its own people or, for that matter, leave any impression to this effect. On the contrary, Taliban are clear on extending their area of influence and challenging everyone that stands in their way.
The government also remains obsessed with the lawyers’ movement. It is under immense pressure from its leading ally on the matter of restoring judges which General (retired) Pervez Musharraf had deposed due to their refusal to endorse emergency clamped last November.
Aitazaz Ahsan, spearheading the lawyers’ movement, is growing impatient with the government on judges’ issue. Last time when he brought a huge crowd to Islamabad, he said that parliament, not the president, was the major obstacle in the way.
“Had I wished so, the demonstrators would have raised the Parliament to ground within hours,” he said when faced with the criticism for not laying a siege on the city to get his demands met. “The movement can get violent,” he has recently warned and appears to be serious.
PML-N has distanced itself away from the government’s move by saying that its leadership was not taken into confidence. Mushahid Hussain Syed (PML-Q) has termed it fatal to fight with one own people. Jamat-i-Islami, which is considered very close to PML-N, has warned of dire consequences in case of any military operation against Taliban who, according to Qazi Hussain Ahmad pose no threat to Peshawar.
Maulana Fazlur Rehman, who just a few days ahead of June 26, when the operation started, had said the government would only awake when Peshawar is overtaken by militants, has also adopted dubious stance on the matter of launching operation in the tribal belt.
The reality that political parties, especially in the coalition government, have no consensus on the matter of curbing militancy in Fata has also been noticed by the Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Boucher, visiting Pakistan during early days of operation. “The situation of law and order is serious in Fata but the government is not concentrating on the issue due to lawyers’ movement and a cold war between the leading coalition partners,” he said.
