The Americans did not stop at three air strikes in less than two months into Pakistan’s tribal areas, their surrogate in Kabul, Hamid Karzai has threatened to chase infiltrators into Pakistan territory. Although the Nato commander ruled out any imminent retaliatory attacks, he justified Karzai’s belligerence as reflection of frustration with militants’ sanctuary in Pakistan’s tribal areas. And a State Department official said in Senate’s foreign relations committee the Nato forces in Afghanistan had the right to hit back into Pakistan territory in pursuit of attackers from across the Durand line. Are the Americans planning to unilaterally intervene into Pakistan territory and the recent escalation in hostility a prelude to it? This may well be the American agenda. Even President Bush is not averse to the idea of hot pursuit by Nato forces. On the face of it, what has hitherto stopped giving a go ahead signal to the Nato forces is the question of timing. How much pressure Washington thinks is necessary at a given time to make the elected regime in Islamabad fall in line on an issue like negotiations with militants is the key question.
The Americans have never been satisfied with Pakistan’s role in the coalition against terror. Not enough has been their constant complaint as they have been urging Islamabad to ‘do more’ in its fight against the so-called Pakistani Taliban. According to critics what the Americans really meant when they chanted ‘not enough’ was to tell Islamabad that ‘if you cannot do it let us do it. Obviously the American urge to intervene militarily in the tribal areas, which they said had provided ‘safe havens’ to al-Qaeda and the Taliban leaders was not acceded to by the Musharraf regime to combat terrorism is sole responsibility of the Pakistan armed forces, and its auxiliary organisation, Islamabad had to led the Americans time and again, ‘we would not allow American troops to operate in any part of Pakistan’ than been Islamabad’s open and clear stance. Apparently the two sides had stuck to the deal, even though the Americans did not bother to consult Islamabad, if and when they resorted to occasional air strikes. However, critics believed that whenever the Americans made louder noises of ‘not enough’, Islamabad was prompted to go for some sort of military operation against the tribal militants.
What seems to be bothering the Americans now is Islamabad’s declared stance that it would not rely on exclusive use of forces against the militants but explore possibilities of a dialogue with them to negotiate peace accords. Negotiated peace agreements with militants, as is now Islamabad’s preference for dealing with the local Taliban, are not acceptable to the Americans. According to what say on the question of truce with militants, this would give them opportunity to recoup and regroup and fight the battle with greater vigour and strength. Needless to say the Americans do not believe in differentiating between ‘hard core gun holders’ and the Taliban sympathisers, and they would wish to treat them alike. The American priority is, use of force and no negotiations barring militants subjugation. What they require of Islamabad, as a coalition partner is the Pakistan armed forces should declare war on tribal militants and continue it till the last militant is killed or has surrendered. Pakistan army is not a mercenary army fighting for a dubious cause in a distant land. It cannot be expected to invade its own country and kill its own people. How low may Islamabad stoop curry favour with its benevolent benefactor (one billion dollar US assistance is received by Pakistan), there is a basic divergence in the perceptions of the two countries vis-à-vis war against terror.
A school of critics believe that if the American pay you money for doing their dirty work they would call terms of the deal also. Islamabad has no option but to oblige the Americans, unless Pakistan has the courage to tell the Americans ‘we cannot afford to fight your war’ and decide to part company with the coalition, which of course is a highly improvable thing to happen in the near future. Sceptics insist there was more to it than the deal that led Pakistan join the US-led coalition that was told to the people. And there is linkage, they say, between the billion subsidy and the American air strikes on the tribal areas. Ironically, an American scholar told Senate foreign relations committee that it was part of a larger Pakistan-US deal.