The threats of Afghan President Hamid Karzai a few days back that the Afghan army would pursue Taliban/militants inside Pakistan may not have any reality. It is not the gun but the man behind the gun.
Karzai during the last many years since he stepped into the Presidency with US support is on record of having given statements of relevant nature. Where the statement of hot pursuit reflected on our insecurity there it reminded me of basic lessons of political science that security and sovereignty are two leading considerations for the existence and survival of a country since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 which led to the rise of nation-states system in Europe. A major threat to a country’s sovereignty comes from security threats, internally and externally.
Thus, a country has to formulate its foreign policy and adjust its internal priorities to keep both at par by not compromising on their sovereignty for security purposes. Countries compromising on their sovereignty for security purpose may not deserve or lose both. And it is often in case of developing and underdeveloped countries where rulers suffer from crisis of legitimacy and in need to secure their regimes/rules plunge the countries into a situation.
Pakistan is unfortunately one of the countries which in large have been criticised for having compromised on its sovereignty for security purpose due to the rulers’ crisis of legitimacy. From the beginning of its existence until the present, rulers of that category joined camps and aligned with forces for security reasons against its sovereignty. Many of its domestic policies, largely formulated under a military regime, indicate that they accepted decisions to avert imminent insecurity insights against far-sighted sovereignty threats.
Pakistan emerged on the world map as an ideological state in a region where its relations could be of rival with only two countries: India and Afghanistan. China was unconcerned about its existence; it was itself undergoing a revolution from below, while Iran welcomed and supported our very existence. Afghanistan opposed our UN membership and raised its concern on international forums about the territory ceded to British India across Durand Line. The threat from Afghanistan was not potential as it being a land-locked periphery without a strong defence depended on good relationship with Pakistan for trade and commercial prosperity. The only potential security threat, to some extent ideological, to Pakistan partially came from India, particularly in the wake of territorial dispute over Kashmir.
Pakistan joined SEATO, CENTO and signed bilateral military pacts with US, allowing it bases (at Badabar) under Ayub Khan. By joining SEATO and CENTO Pakistan, as Mushtaq Ahmed writes, jumped from qualified neutrality to unqualified alliance. In his words, “The repercussions of our membership of SEATO and CENTO were felt on our relations with all the countries with which we maintained diplomatic ties, especially the ones favourable disposed towards us. Whatever might have been the other motives in pursuing such a policy, these were outweighed by economic assistance and military aid”.
The major military threat, if there could be to Pakistan’s sovereignty, appeared from India for which neither of the alliances gave guarantee or security. In the wake of Pakistan joining the alliances it should have received military aid from allies in 1965 war against India but it did not -- a major factor for pulling out of the alliances under Bhutto in 1971.
The major security consideration for Pakistan again came in 1979 after Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan to support PDPA government under Taraki. The changes in Afghanistan posed threats to the peace and security in the region. India under balanced diplomacy and parliamentary supremacy over foreign affairs neither opposed the Saur revolution nor invasion. Iran opposed the invasion and hosted two million refugees strictly in the camps and did not allow any military activity. But Pakistan blindly jumped into the conflict by opposing the invasion, hosting millions of refugees and allowing military activities in seven camps in Balochistan and the NWFP for Mujahideen, majority of them now branded as Al Qaeda/Taliban.
Ziaul Haq suffering from the crisis of legitimacy with a dire need of external support for his regime justified its alliance essential to ensure security purposes for sovereignty of Pakistan. The Afghan War brought many menaces to Pakistan: the drugs and arms expansion, softening of borders with Afghanistan for hot pursuit, and law and order deterioration with emergence of mafia. The traditional values of security and tranquility in tribal areas of the two provinces of NWFP and Balochistan started waning. The Balochistan insurgency and Waziristan situation can directly be linked with that.
We supported Taliban largely for security considerations in 1994 as the situation in Afghanistan in the wake of Soviet withdrawal posed a security threat. Pakistan was in a difficult situation but could have a way out as a representative government, no matter weak or agencies tempted. It should not have gotten involved in the situation to the extent where its role appeared of the maker of Taliban.
Pakistan had no choice but to take a U turn after 9/11 under a situation where a military ruler having toppled a civilian government had legitimacy crisis. As Thierry Meyssan writes in her book 9/11 The Big Lie the major task for US was reprisals against Afghanistan. Musharraf was dictated to undo Taliban now the leading menace to free world as communism was decades ago. Pakistan allowed our intelligence network, which once helped in building Taliban, bases for day-to-day aerial attack on Afghanistan and hot-pursuit of American forces inside FATA in hunt of Taliban/Al Qaeda. In case we had an elected parliament and good representative system we could have the middle way by not being dictated.
