Before 9/11, terrorism was confined to a few pockets on the globe. However, the ripple effect of the unimaginative response to the 9/11 acts of terror has transformed a major part of the world into a living inferno. Pakistan is one of the countries that have been hit the hardest by terrorism and which have paid a huge price for offering services in a war that appears less to root out terrorism than to promote it.
The areas constituting Pakistan have been a multi-religious region for over 10 centuries and the clerics here were never a source of violence. Preaching the value of love/tolerance, the clerics spread the word of God by personal examples of piety, humility and selflessness. The one thing farthest from their methodology was militancy. However, the US-sponsored ‘Jihad’ against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, in December 1979, gave some Madaris a militant outlook, turning them into training/ recruiting centres for Mujahideen fighting war in Afghanistan.
Now, some areas along Pak-Afghan border are perceived by the West to be one of the main centres of terror. However, till the Soviet inspired coup in Afghanistan, these areas were free from terrorist activities. The ascendancy of the communists in Afghanistan in 1978 and direct Soviet occupation of that country in 1979 was considered by the international community to be a great threat to the Free World. With material support of the USA and some other countries, volunteers were recruited from Pakistan and elsewhere, provided guidance/training, given arms/equipment and sent to Afghanistan to help the Afghans in their liberation war. During the decade long struggle for Afghanistan’s liberation, the tribesmen received high profile visits, both from within and outside the country, and innumerable briefings, exhorting them to join the jihad to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan.
In April 1999, US Republican Congressman, Dana Rohrabacher himself involved with policy in Afghanistan for 20 years, gave this testimony to a Senate sub-committee: “There is and has been a covert policy by this administration to support the Taliban movement’s control of Afghanistan….This amoral or immoral policy is based on the assumption that the Taliban would bring stability to Afghanistan and permit the building of oil pipelines from Central Asia through Afghanistan to Pakistan….I believe the administration has maintained this covert goal.”
However, after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the international community did not bother to de-motivate/debrief the Mujahideen, ensure their return to their homelands and rehabilitation in the mainstream. For want of proper de-orientation, it is possible that even after achieving the goal, some elements amongst the tribesmen might be inculcating feelings as if they were still in a state of Jihad!
For over a decade, the Mujahideen were heroes/darlings of the West, but within months after the Soviet withdrawal they were dubbed as villains. Nobody cared to educate the citizens about the reasons for this transformation in the status of the Mujahideen. Resultantly, the inhabitants believe that Afghanistan was earlier occupied by the Soviets and now the allied forces are occupying one of its parts. They fail to understand if Jihad was justified to expel the Russians from Afghanistan then why is it not so to expel people of other nationalities who are ruthlessly killing their brethren.
If the tribesmen were properly debriefed/de-motivated, the situation might have been different! The best course would have been to secure isolation of those few persons who were harbouring the Al-Qaeda, from the mainstream by making a judicious use of the media and peer groups, and then persuade the tribesmen to surrender Al-Qaeda members, if they had given asylum to any.
Presently, despite the inhabitants yearning for peace, prolonged presence of troops and intermittent action against the militants, peace eludes the region which, located along the historic silk route, has always remained the nerve centre of super power rivalry. The prolonged turmoil is proving detrimental to the interests of the entire region. For example, completion of Iran-Pakistan-India and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline projects, increase in trade between ECO and SAARC countries and FDI inflow hinge upon peace in the region.
Furthermore, political analysts do not rule out the possibility of foreign hands in militancy/terrorism in Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan has to counter not only Al-Qaeda, but also other inimical forces in its war against terror. Meanwhile, Pakistan has taken special measures to curb terrorism, and has also made its anti-terror law more stringent and funding of terrorism a non-bailable offence with jail terms ranging from 4-10 years.
In the present times, the geo-strategic importance of this region has further increased due to:
1. Proximity to large deposits of fossil fuels in Central Asia/Caspian Sea when viewed in the context of fast depleting oil reserves of the Middle East, and neo-conservatives’ notion that “He who controls energy, controls the globe.”
2. Concentration of nuclear states (Russia, China, India and Pakistan), neighbouring Iran’s ambitions and presence of Russian facilities in nearby Kazakhstan.
3. Potential of some states around this region to form rival power blocs.
4. Emergence of Afghanistan as a hub of narco trade, initially with the tacit approval of secret agencies to enable the warlords to maintain their militias battle-worthy for the Afghan Jihad. And, above all,
5. Salvaging sinking economies of some leading developed countries.
For fulfilling their designs, it suits the vested interests to keep the pot boiling so that they could carry on their activities, on one pretext or the other. Though one would not deny the existence of some religious fanatics in that belt, but taking advantage of the Afghan Jihad, this time, the smugglers cleverly tried to camouflage their activities and give it a religious cover.
Using FCR as a tool, the system of carrots and stick – rewards for maintaining peace and imposing penalties for breach of peace, worked well in the tribal areas in the past. Given a chance, it could achieve positive results even now, if peace was negotiated with a whole tribe and, with the help/support of the tribe, an effort was made to isolate the militants.
For achieving this objective, “Negotiations and cease-fire, or their offer, should be seen as one of a range of tools for overcoming militancy,” as Paul Staniland asserts: Indeed, there are three good strategic reasons to talk. First, it is possible that an arrangement can be made with militant groups to end violence. The Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland, ANC in South Africa, Mizo National Front in India, and Maoist rebels in Nepal have all been fully brought into the political system. One of the most striking, if tentative, recent examples comes from Iraq, where the US military has come to understandings with Sunni armed groups to cooperate against Al-Qaeda. Washington initially denounced these groups in the most vitriolic terms as ruthless and blood-thirsty terrorists, yet engaging with them has provided some measure of peace/stability in a troubled society. Second, the prospect of negotiation can weaken armed groups, leading to splits/internal dissension that reduce the threat they pose. For instance, Tamil Tigers suffered a major split in 2004 during a peace process, and Kashmir’s Hizbul Mujahideen fractured into rival factions between 2000 and 2003 due to disagreement about a cease-fire.
The argument for negotiations and cease-fire is reinforced by the fact that some Muslim countries have already undertaken credible initiatives by engaging in an extensive “hearts-and-minds” and “out-reach” campaign to win over the former ideologues of radical movements and their followers. It is a strategy aimed at turning extremists against extremists, and it is making a difference in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia.
When viewed in this context, the multi-faceted strategy adopted now by Pakistan seems to be a step in the right direction. As outlined by Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, talks will be held with tribal elders of areas where they have great influence, and only with those who publicly put down arms and renounce violence; that they will have no truck with terrorists and will not let the terrorists use Pakistan’s territory, and most important, that no shelter is given to foreigners on Pakistan’s soil.
However, the shift in Pakistan policy has not found favour with Afghan and US leaders. But, persons familiar with the problem support Pakistan’s policy of negotiations to curb terrorism. According to Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations, despite appearances, Islamabad is not stabbing Washington in the back, acting irrationally, or being willfully ignorant to the threat posed by militants. Although Washington has reason to be wary of any truce blessed by Pakistani politicians and Islamist militants, there are valid reasons why Washington should support the deal making…First, the Pakistani government appears to have learned something from its mistakes. In the past, Islamabad failed, for instance, to recognize that a deal must be made with tribal leaders, and instead blundered in signing arrangements directly with militant organizations. This time, rather than negotiating with militants directly, tribal elders have been the primary interlocutors. Moreover, the Pakistani government now understands it must negotiate from a position of strength. This deal comes at the end of a lengthy army-enforced blockade of the Mehsud territories…By demonstrating the punitive capacity of the state, government negotiators probably strengthened their position vis-à-vis the tribes.... A number of recent US-supported initiatives to train/equip FC units as well as to establish border-coordinating centres along Pak-Afghan frontier would benefit from even a few months of relative calm. Finally, the cease-fire could offer a range of new development projects the chance to get started in parts of the country that have been plagued by violence.
One wonders that when America endorses talks or is ready to talk with militants elsewhere, including with Maoists in Nepal, then why is she so vehemently opposed to negotiations with the Muslim militants in FATA. Before concluding, permit me to reiterate that a just world order is the best solution to defeat terrorism. It is the responsibility of all states to see that the legitimate rights long denied to people are granted to them. Eradicating the main causes for anger of the aggrieved communities is bound to promote global peace and stability.
(Excerpts from a paper read by Mr. Masood at a seminar on “Terrorism as a challenge for nation-building – bilateral approach for solutions” organized by German ‘Konrad Adenauer Stiftung’ in Islamabad on June 12. In addition to Mr. Masood, those who addressed the seminar included: KAS Representative Dr. Babak Khalatbari, Mr. Tophoven from Germany, Dr. Hamidullah Norreabad and Mr. Masrullah Arsalai from Afghanistan and Ms. Humera Iqbal from Pakistan. )
