During over eight years of General Pervez Musharaf-led regime, the MQM retained total control over Karachi and monopolized the governance of Sindh. It had its own Governor, all of the key ministries of the provincial government, the entire local bodies’ setup, including the City Nazim, and even recruited its own community police from amongst the organization’s diehard activists.
As for the support MQM received from General Musharraf in the Centre, when its militants engaged in a killing spree on May 12 last year, which claimed the lives of over 40 people, General Musharraf termed it a “show of people’s power.” This was the extent and the depth of linkage between the Musharraf-led Establishment and the MQM-led power machinery in Karachi and Sindh.
It is, therefore, quite understandable that just as Musharraf finds himself in an utterly frustrating situation, so does his partner in Karachi and Sindh, in the aftermath of February 18 elections, which have brought the PPP, PML-N, ANP and their allies—all inherently anti-MQM and anti-Musharraf—into power.
No surprise that MQM chief Altaf Hussain, in his telephonic address on Tuesday to MQM supporters in Karachi asked them to prepare themselves for trying times (implying as if a war is approaching). Most of these supporters get a lump sum amount of Rs. 500 per person from the organization for bearing up with the lunatic talk of the MQM chief in self exile in London.
In the aftermath of February 18 elections, the tables have been effectively turned against Musharraf and all of the ethno-political forces who enabled him to perpetuate his dictatorial rule. As for MQM, the benefits it acquired from the Musharraf era were far beyond political or economic: throughout this time, its militant wing allegedly attempted to physically eliminate all of the organization’s perceived enemies; be they the leaders of the leaders of the Sunni Tehrik, or members of the lawyers community, or the supporters of MQM Haqiqi.   
The connection between Musharraf and MQM has not been merely one between a dictator and a supportive politico-militant organization. Both share a common Muhajir identity. That MQM has changed its nomenclature from Muhajir to Muttahida does nothing to change the ground reality of it being a Muhajir outfit. And they way Musharraf allied so closely with MQM in the past over eight years of his rule leaves little doubt about the ethnic basis of their relationship.
Given that, the reason public hatred against Musharraf has been so unprecedented is because he is not only a General, for whom the only constituency is the military cantonment, but also a Muhajir, which is an ethnic minority in the country.
It is not surprising, therefore, that as the evolving political circumstances becomes increasingly troubling for Musharraf, the level of frustration of his staunch ethnic partners in Karachi and Sindh is galloping.
In retrospect, therefore, Musharraf is not the only one fighting a battle for survival; the MQM is engaged in the same battle. In the first instance, it responded to the reconciliation bid of the PPP leadership, but the taste of unbridled power is so overwhelming that its militants repeated May 12 on April 9, forcing the PPP-led government in the Centre to appoint Shoaib Saddal, known for effectively combating MQM militancy in Karachi in the past, as the IG of Sindh Police.
In case Musharraf departs from the national scene, then the situation in Karachi and urban Sindh should be as difficult as Altaf Hussain himself seems to foresee now. In his Tuesday speech, however, he assured the MQM audience in Karachi that they need not worry about the difficult times ahead to be like those they faced in 1992, since they were “now living in 2008 when the rule with the power of gun and ammunition will not be allowed.”
Obviously, Altaf Hussain now fears the vengeance of those who suffered at the hands of MQM during over eight years of Musharraf’s rule. He may equally be fearing that once his ethnic partner, despite his military origins, departs from the national scene, then, like the early 1990s, the state establishment may also join the political forces (now manned entirely by non-Mujahir leaders and parties) in crushing MQM militants.
As long as Musharraf is there, an effective government campaign against MQM militancy may not be possible. This is simply because the organization still has its Governor in Sindh in the person of Ishrat ul Ibad, who is an accused in the murder case of Hakim Saeed. The Governor can only be changed by the President. Musharraf as President, however controversially elected, will not take this decision. The MQM also still has its local bodies’ setup in Karachi in place.
As long as these two factors remain relevant to the politics of Karachi, MQM’s battle for survival may not enter as serious a state as it will most likely as soon as Musharraf’s departure becomes a reality.
For that, the blame would lie squarely on the shoulders of MQM and its principal ethnic ally and the most powerful person of Pakistan in the past over eight years: General Musharraf.
One of the moral wrongs that General Musharraf has committed is to reverse the natural process of evolution in Pakistani nationhood. There is no doubt that the demand for Pakistan was made in principal by the Muslim elites of Uttar Pradesh and other Muslim minority provinces in British India.
These Muslim elites dominated the politics and civil-military bureaucracy of the country in the early history. Gradually, however, the four ethnic groups of Sindh, Punjab, the Frontier and Balochistan reduced the Muhajir clout in politics and civil-military bureaucracy. That is the proper context to understand the emergence of MQM as a militant organization right from beginning. The Muhajirs targeted every other ethnic group in Karachi and urban Sindh. Then they turned against the State, which crushed them in the 1990s.
What Musharraf has done is to simply reverse the course of history: An organization that was declared terrorist by the state itself—and which spared no opportunity in committing acts of terrorism against all of the ethnic groups, representative of 90 per cent non-Urdu speaking, non-Muhajir population—was within no time made a political party. So much so that during a couple of years prior to the last elections, the Musharraf-led Establishment engaged in a deliberate campaign to increase MQM’s political clout in the Punjab province. So much so that Musharraf-led Establishment encouraged the MQM to create s support base for itself among the Kashmiri and Hazara people in the guise of providing relief to earthquake victims. So much so that in the guise of National Reconciliation Ordinance, General Musharraf pardoned all the criminals of MQM in one go.
Behind Musharraf’s so much love and special favour to MQM, their common ethnic bond may have been an important factor. The MQM has a reason to worry and fear as to what might happen to it after the demise of Musharraf. Its increasingly reactionary attitude since the coming to power of PPP-led government in the Centre and Sindh, a militant expression of which we saw on April 9, is understandable. More of such militancy is likely to follow, unless the payback time really begins.
In the absence of Musharraf, we can even expect General Naseerullah Babar to be appointed the Governor of Sindh. The QMO is already upset with the appointment of Shoaib Saddal as IGP Sindh. Imagine what it would be like to be a MQM militant with General Babar as Governor Sindh!
It is also possible that in the qualitatively new circumstances post-Musharraf, the government of Pakistan may apply to the British government for extraditing Altaf Hussain, who manages an extensive network of MQM’s International Secretariat from London, interfering directly in the internal affairs of the country, allegedly financing its affairs with public money stolen by MQM stalwarts in Karachi and even directly sponsoring MQM’s militancy there.