JUI-F fighting for survival
Some reliable press reports suggest that Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s JUI is likely to draw a blank in the February elections. In the provincial capital Peshawar the Maulana had conveniently disappeared from the scene of action leaving no signs of his party’s once formidable political presence, and its political landscape has dramatically changed to a degree that it appears unbelievable that the JUI-F was in power for five years until a couple of months ago. If hoisting of party flags over rooftops is any indication of vibrant campaigning, it was either the ANP, or the PPP which stole the show, but the JUI-F was nowhere in the run, not even a poor third. Some observers said, to jump to hasty conclusions is often misleading. Peshawar has never been a JUI-F stronghold, whatever success the MMA had achieved here in 2002 elections was due to the urban-based cadres of the Jamaat-e-Islami. Nevertheless, subsequent press reports projected a dismal picture of the JUI-F’s election prospects in its known power-base, Bannu and DI Khan.
If one were to believe knowledgeable sources, Maulana Fazlur Rehman himself pitted against a strong PPP candidate, was in danger of losing his own ‘safe’ seat from DI Khan. One may recall that Fazlur Rehman’s father Mufti Mehmud had won this seat in the 1970 elections, defeating Zulfikar Ali Bhutto -- the only place Bhutto lost of the five seats he had contested. In any case it appears to be the end of the crafty Maulana’s brief affair with power, perhaps the lifetime chance he has had to call the shots in two provinces and earn for himself the coveted position of Leader of the Opposition. According to some critics, the Maulana was himself to blame for an unceremonious exit from centre-stage politics. He overplayed the ‘political manoeuvring’ card, they say, and in a bid to ride two boats at the same time lost track of his moorings. On the face of it he was the oppositions chief spokesman in parliament, but the opposition parties had a lingering distrust of his bona fides, as some of them dubbed him as ‘Trojan horse’ planted by the regime.
Political Pundits are prone to attributing two main reasons for JUI-F’s fall from popular grace. 1) The anti-incumbency factor accentuated by the MMA-run provincial government’s lacklustre performance in its five-year term. 2) The MMA’s breakup, and the Jamaat-e-Islami parting company with the JUI-F. There was nothing the MMA government could show with pride as its singular achievement. There were no major crises, scams or debacles during its five-year term in office, but there was also nothing to write home about in terms of efficacious functioning. On the contrary the MMA coalition partners, marred by infighting gave a poor account of themselves as political allies. In the local bodies they failed to draw a joint list of candidates, as the Jamaat-e-Islami and the JUI-F did not only fight against each other but also had in audacity to conclude seats adjustment accords with other parties against their own coalition parties.
The MMA had contested the 2002 polls on the basis of an ‘Islamisation’ agenda. Apart from making some symbolic changes like removing what is said, ‘obscene and indecent’ hoardings from public places, the only significant bid it made towards ‘enforcement of Shariah’ was to introduce a system of parallel courts headed by ‘Mullahs’ at every level. But before the law could be enforced it was challenged in the Supreme Court, which ruled it unconstitutional. The MMA accused the centre of sabotaging the Islamisation drive and vowed to purse the legal battle and its political implications to the finish. But, ironically enough it did not make noises loud enough to suggest that it has any intention of taking on Islamabad on this issue. On the contrary it was rather apologetic in defending the controversial law, insisting that it had no design to undermine the country’s judicial system but only wanted to simplify and expedite the lengthy and cumbersome judicial process. However, critics who attributed sinister motives, charged the MMA with hatching a devious plan to dole out jobs the hundreds of ‘mullahs’ and arm them with judicial authority to reinforce its powerbase.
Married by political expediency the MMA’s performance in enforcing the ‘Shariah’ did not match Fazlur Rehman’s high profile public posture. Ironically the crafty Maulana had declared some years ago that ‘If Taliban were to invade Pakistan I would side with them because they stand for spreading the message of Islam’. And more recently he had defended the Lal masjid ‘moral brigades’ punitive action against those who, they said, were guilty of violating the norms of Islamic code of morality. But in the JUI-F’s own fiefdom, barring some half-hearted attempts to project ‘Islamic morality’ businesses remained as usual, as movie houses showed, films, video-shops sold cassettes, and women without veils roamed about in the shopping centres. There was no demand, ala Taliban to grow beards, wear burqas, or stop girls from going to schools, or taking up jobs.
The MMA government was, however, accused of letting things drift in Swat valley where a group of extremists led by Maulvi Fazlullah arrogating to themselves the right to enforce Shariah defied the writ of the government, by raising a corps of armed warriors, seized police stations and other government buildings, and installed themselves as the de facto administration in the entire area. The MMA government remained a silent spectator, as it made no attempt to intervene despite the emergence of a ‘state within a state’, nor it requisitioned the army in aid of civil administration which it could have, and let the things remain as they were until the caretaker government took over and called for army action against the insurgents.
The MMA’s break up could be seen as a writing on the wall much earlier than it actually split and the Jamaat-e-Islami parted company with the JUI-F. The MMA partners could have indefinitely dragged the uneasy alliance (even now its demise has not been official pronounced, and ‘freezed’ is the expression being used to explain its current situation), but a deathblow was dealt to it by Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s odd behaviour during the Presidential election. His allies in the opposition were so disgusted with his duplicity that they accused him of being in league with President Musharraf. We could have robbed the presidential polls of whatever credibility it had by dissolving the NWFP assembly, the opposition said, but the Maulana lent a helping hand to Musharraf by prolonging the assembly until the polls were held. Fazlur Rehman was all set to part company with Jamaat-e-Islami when he refused to discuss the issue of boycott of polls with his coalition partner.
According to some critics, MMA’s victory in the 2002 polls was not a genuine electoral success, since it was an all-time low turnout of voters that enabled the MMA (in particular the Jamaat’s committed vote bank) to poll its votes, while the rival parties bore the brunt electorates apathy. Ironically, a school of critics is not willing to let the MMA take credit for cashing in on the pro-Taliban popular sentiment. On the contrary they see an ISI hand in stage-managing the show. Much water has flowed down the rivers since the MMA was seen by the agencies as potential ally of the regime. No such patronage is now available to the ‘great compromiser’ and Maulana Fazlur Rehman will have to entirely rely on his own political muscle to perform in the forthcoming electoral battle. The calculating Maulana may not have heard of the famous saying in ‘Bridge’, “whenever in doubt play the trump’, but it seems his ‘trump card’ in situations of doubt has been to proceed to Saudi Arabia for a fortnight of ‘meditation’.
