What makes American think tanks plus their media so hysterical about Pakistan’s nuclear programme that they miss no opportunity to run a vilification campaign against it. There is no end to the campaign since they always find a convenient alibi to turn their guns against Pakistan. But as Pakistan’s nuclear capability is now a fait accompli, willy-nilly acknowledged by the whole world, and it cannot be undone, or reversed by any sanction regime, the line-of-attack has been more subtle that ever before. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal may fall into ‘wrong hands’ has of late been the focus of their tirade. To put it more bluntly, what the opinion-makers in the West, the US in particular, have been suggesting is that there is a real danger of Islamic militants, more precisely al-Qaeda and company, getting hold of some big bombs and use, or threaten to use them against targets in the West to settle old scores. And they have been trying to draw world attention to the threat that the Islamic extremists hold to the ‘civilized world’. Moral of the story, don’t lose time to cut Pakistan’s nuclear programme down to size, before it could cause trouble more catastrophic than 9/11.
There could be two reasons for some high-profile Americans to project this kind of dooms day scenario, even though observers in Pakistan believe that ‘Pakistan-bashing’ is rooted in the American history ever since Zulfikar Ali Bhutto incurred their wrath by launching Pakistan’s nuclear programme, which was instantly branded as ‘Islamic bomb’. That the Americans have little faith in our ability or competence, to establish a viable and secure and safety system is one reason for their lingering lack of trust in what we say is a well-defined ‘command and control system’ for ensuring the stability and security of the nuclear programme. The lack of faith in Islamabad’s word has been compounded by instability and political uncertainty in the country, as Pakistan-watchers abroad regard political developments in Pakistan highly volatile and unpredictable. Anything could happen in Pakistan, the regime in Islamabad may be toppled; the people may take to streets, or the anti-West forces may rise to power. To trust Pakistan with such a sensitive responsibility as the security of its nuclear programme, critics have said, would be a gamble.
Although we are now partners in the American-led war against terror, and a front line member of the international coalition fighting the al-Qaeda and Taliban militants, the Americans have not been entirely satisfied with our role. Pakistan is not doing enough to fight the Islamic extremists, has been their frequent grouse. Ironically, the American response to our contribution to fighting the Islamic militants is a reflection of thinking in some quarters that the Pakistani establishment is reluctant to go all the way because it has not fully outgrown its past linkages with the Islamic extremist forces. And critics in the West especially Americans, have been alleging that there are still powerful lobbies within the Pakistani establishment, in particular the ISI, which share the ‘Taliban world view’. Thus the assumption leads to the conclusion that Islamic extremists still have access to crucial decision-making bodies, and powerful backers to help them out with fringe benefits. The scenario, under the circumstances, leaves room for ‘wrong hands’ to make dividends from Pakistan’s nuclear capability. The ‘collaboration’ angle, rather than the ‘incompetence syndrome’ also gained ground in the wake of Dr A Q Khan network being held responsible for selling nuclear technology to Iran and Libya etc. Although A Q Khan was singled out as a handy whipping boy for the transfer of nuclear technology scam, international opinion is not fully convinced that it was an aberration, rather than a failing of the system.
President Musharraf has of late been focussing on allaying the fear of the international quarters that there was no possibility of its nuclear arsenal falling into wrong hands. We have established a secure system, he has said. More recently, Lt Gen (R) Khalid Kidwai, Director General Strategic Plans Division (SPD), briefing foreign journalists spoke about the ‘foolproof’ system. The multi-layered physical security and professional command and control system, he said, ‘was designed to effectively guard country’s nuclear weapons and materials against all categories of threat’. One may recall that the setting up a command and control system is not a recent development; in fact Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had assigned the task of overseeing the ‘control and command system’ to two of his most trusted and competent aides, Agha Shahi and Ghulam Ishaq Khan.