Once again Pakistan is given thumbs-down by the US media and un-named military officials of not doing enough to counter the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the border region with Afghanistan.
The NY Times report alleged in its 24th December edition that according to US military officials a large portion of the $5 billion US military aid to Pakistan to counter terrorism was not going to the campaign against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Instead, the NYT sources claim, this aid is going to various military units and programmes designed to counter India on its eastern borders.
It is not the first time that Pakistan has been accused of not "doing enough" in the war against Taliban and Al-Qaeda in its border regions. Many of the US allegations against Pakistan are rooted in the frustration of the former over its own failures in Afghanistan. However, after an analysis of Pakistan’s history, geo-strategic and comparative military standing makes it quite obvious why Pakistan would prefer to give high military priority to India.
Since its inception, Pakistan’s comparative military disadvantage vis-à-vis India has been cited largely as the driving force behind Pakistan’s dependence on US strategic alliances and military cooperation. Ayub Khan seriously initiated a close military partnership between Pakistan and the US in the 1950s; this cooperation was at its all times high during Gen Ziaul Haq’s rule, and still continues under Pervez Musharraf. Even post-11/9 experience illustrates confidently that Pakistan’s alliance with the US in the war on terror has been largely motivated by the Indian factor.
After the 2001 terror attack in the United States, Pakistan was immediately concerned with the New Delhi’s offer to Washington to use Indian airbases and territory in a campaign against Afghanistan. Islamabad quickly realized that the Indian offer could produce a campaign against Pakistan for its pro-Taliban standing and hence accepted taking part in the US-led operations against the Taliban regime. By joining the US-led campaign, Islamabad in fact largely reduced any direct Indian military actions in Afghanistan or even Pakistan. The fact is that it’s the large military force of India that still poses the imminent strategic threat to Pakistan on its eastern front, not Taliban insurgents on its western borders. Presently, some of the challenges facing Pak-Afghan relations are also related to the growing influence of India in Afghanistan. India is the second largest importer of Afghan products after the US and is establishing deeper economic, political, cultural and social cooperation with the Karzai government. New Delhi’s diplomatic, intelligence, economic and cultural operations in Afghanistan are so concentrated in the eastern Pukhtun regions that it is impossible for Islamabad not to be alarmed.
The opinion in Islamabad is that if Pakistan wants to counter the growing influence of India in Afghanistan, it must partially support groups critical and even hostile to the India-friendly Kabul government. It is not only Pakistan which is alarmed, but recent developments suggests that both Iran and China suspects the pro-American and pro-Indian government in Afghanistan and will covertly support factions which could hinder such a development.
Iran has been both a regional partner and competitor to Pakistan in recent decades. In Afghanistan, Tehran opposed the Sunni Taliban and stood by the Northern Alliance, which was comprised heavily by the Persian/Dari-speaking Tajiks. However, in recent years, the Iranians have become more intimidated by the US military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq – which Tehran considers an imminent challenge. Iran has delivered some $600 million in aid to Afghan reconstruction in the post-Taliban years.
Officially, Iranians are extending their support to the Afghanistan government and also want to cooperate with Pakistan to rebuild the war-ravaged country. However, as noted earlier, in recent years, Tehran has grown very suspicious and critical of the American presence in Afghanistan and Iraq. In this context, regardless of the Sunni-Shia differences, it is probable that Tehran may even aid Sunni insurgents to counter the US presence. Though Tehran is still critical of the Taliban movement, it does identify the US military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq as a far greater physical threat to Iran than any re-emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan. In this context, it should be noted that the British troops claimed seizing arms that were allegedly being supplied by Iran to insurgents in the Helmand province in southern Afghanistan in May 2007, and while the British forces did not assert that Iran had directly aided the insurgents, NATO commanders believe that Iran may be indifferent if their arms eventually did end up in the hands of the Taliban insurgents
Next is China. In September 2007, the British government complained to the Chinese government about the increasing flow of sophisticated China-made weapons found in the hands of insurgents in Afghanistan. China is unquestionably worried about the presence of US in Afghanistan and the expansion of US influence into Central Asia, which it sees as a direct challenge to Chinese interests. In this context, it would make sense for Beijing to rely more on forces in Afghanistan, which are also antagonistic to the United States. Beijing has naturally denied allegations of any covert support to insurgents in Afghanistan and there is a possibility that such US-led claims are completely wrong. But such governmental denial is a common practice regardless of the factual realities.
In fact, the US government also denies having any larger geo-strategic interests such as control over Central Asian oil routes and trade by controlling Afghanistan and continues to reiterate that its military invasion is only for the freedom of the Afghan people. Still, there is hardly anyone in the world who seriously believes that US invasions are driven by anything else but the covert ambition of strategic domination of land, resources and peoples. It is an established fact now that the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were largely motivated by the neoconservative American plans to extend American global hegemony by bringing the entire Middle East and Central Asian region under Washington’s supremacy. Consequently, to counter such plans of American hegemony and domination on the Middle East and the Central Asian regions; it makes sense why Afghanistan’s neighbours are also working to hinder the geo-strategic ambitions of a country, which is practically under the control of the US armed forces.
