Past couple of weeks have seen a heightened diplomatic activity in the power centres of Pakistan, cities of Lahore and Islamabad in particular, not to strengthen the country’s relations with the outside world, but to “stabilize” its politics.
If US intervention in Pakistani politics was not enough, now we see the French ambassador, the British High Commissioner, the Spanish ambassador, the Swedish—the list goes on—openly meeting politicians, holing press conferences, urging politicians not to boycott the elections, so on and so forth. Only the envoys from Papua New Guinea and the Vatican City have yet to play their respective role in Pakistani politics.
Such a joke aside, the country seems to have become a joke, with critics looking for depictions for it that must go beyond Banana Republic. Among nearly 200 countries of the world, there is hardly any country at peacetime today where envoys of other states interfere so much in internal political matters.
One of the most respected principles of international law, one that has been integral to international conventions since the foundation of the state system in 15th century, including the UN Charter, is a state’s non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.
Yet, in Pakistan’s case, almost on a daily basis, we see envoys of “influential” foreign countries playing quite an “active” role in domestic politics. Among the foreign ambassadors, US envoy to Anne Patterson has been most active, and one can understand why.
Direct Intervention in Politics
In the past couple of weeks, besides several other engagements, she has met both Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, and not the first time since their return from exile. After meeting Sharif, she called for “the candidates and the people to fully participate” in the coming elections. “For elections to be credible, detained members of political parties and civil society must be released,” she said.
At the same time, the French ambassador Regis de Belenet also made headlines after meeting the leader of JUI Maulana Fazlur Rehman. According to reports, the “meeting lasted for an hour and discussed a host of issues, including the current political scenario of the country.”
During the meeting, the JUI leader urged the French ambassador to “exert pressure on President Musharraf to lift all bans and curbs and restore the superior judiciary.” For his part, ambassador Belenet told Fazlur Rehman that France wanted to see Pakistan flourish as a democratic state and hoped for transparent polls in the country.”
How could the Swedish and Spanish ambassador be left behind? Ambassadors Anna Karin Enestrom of Sweden and Jose Maria Tobles Fraga of Spain joined the French ambassador in Lahore to “expressed their concern and disappointment after the government did not allow them to meet Aitzaz Ahsan. They reportedly said “there could not be fair and free elections after the arrest of political leaders, activists and lawyers.”
If this was not enough, Benzair Bhutto took the initiative of holding a series of meetings at her residence in Islamabad with ambassadors of 21 countries, including 18 from Muslim countries to “discuss the country’s political scenario after the formation of a joint committee by the APDM and the ARD to chalk out a Charter of Demands to ensure transparent polls or to boycott the process.”
“We do not want to boycott the election process but at the same time, we want a level playing field for all stakeholders in transparent elections,” she was quoted as saying to US ambassador Patterson.
The Muslim ambassadors who met Bhutto included those from Saudi Arabia, Oman, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Morocco, Iraq, Sudan, Algeria, Lebanon, Qatar and Yemen. Later, British High Commissioner Robert Edward Brinkley and Spanish ambassador Graga called on her separately. Benazir met the US ambassador in Islamabad at the ambassador’s residence, stated the press release of the PPP Media Centre in Islamabad.
Foreign Office Reaction
In fact, the situation depicting ambassadors running amok became to embarrassing for the government that the Foreign Office had to intervene. Finally, on Monday, it asked foreign diplomats stationed in Islamabad “not to publicly comment on the domestic political situation.”
“We have no objection to their meeting with anyone, but diplomats should not make public comments after such meetings,” Foreign Office spokesman Mohammad Sadiq said. “We expect them to follow the standard behaviour and diplomatic etiquettes.”
The spokesman did not have any objection to their meetings, which symbolically mean interference in politics at a time when the country is facing a pre-poll political turmoil. The only thing that the spokesman wants from foreign diplomats is that they should not give on-spot television interviews after the meetings.
Obviously, one cannot single out Musharraf for criticism pertaining to foreign diplomatic interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs, since almost every political leader is sparing no opportunity in reaching out to foreigners for turning the domestic political situation in his or his favor, thereby making a total mockery of a nuclear weapons-laden Islamic Republic.
However, years from now, when we look back at the legacy of Musharraf’s rule in a bid to trace the causes of future turmoil in current era, there is no reach why Musharraf will not be then condemned for making the Pakistani policy soft enough to let any Tom, Dick and Harry from abroad attempt to chalk out our national destiny sans the wishes of Pakistanis.
Musharraf Sets a Precedent
Pakistan has been plagued with foreign interference in internal affairs ever since its inception for being a week state, which, in order to combat security threat from India, had to take help from a big power, most the US, which always came with strings attached. However, the sort of subservience before the foreign powers that Pakistan has seen in the past eight years of Musharraf’s rule has no precedent in the country’s history.
In fact, after staging the military coup on October 12, 1999, the first foreign call that General Pervez Musharraf made was to his American friend in arms, General Anthony Zinni, the then head of the US Central Command, who at the time was visiting Egypt. He explained the reasons for the coup. General Zinni listened to General Musharraf’s pleas, promising to get back to him after returning to Washington, DC.
It was this telephone call that basically set the peculiar pattern of rampant foreign interference in the country’s internal affairs in the past eight years to the extent of even ambassadors, leave alone top visiting dignitaries of the likes of Us Secretaries of Defense or State, having their respective share in Pakistan’s political pie.
Did the coup leader of Pakistan owe an explanation to the United States that within no time, he would call up to explain why he did so? Such a tendency can only depict a slavish mentality, a pattern we have continued to observe in the past eight years. When, for instance, Bush visited Islamabad in April last year, Musharraf standing next to him in front of the presidency addressing a joint press conference, would explain at length to his US counterpart why American-style democracy did not suit Pakistan, and that it was only his vision for a step-by-step political approach that suited the country.
America’s right to Intervene?
In the eight years of his rule, especially in the aftermath of 9/11, Musharraf has been a key US ally in the War on Terror. “I look into his eyes and see a great friend” became a typical Bush phrase for General Musharraf, whenever the two appeared before TV cameras in the lawn of the White House or the US Presidential resort at Camp David or his ranch in Texas.
Bush has patted on Musharraf’s back so many times, and Musharraf has sought advice from Bush so openly and repeatedly that it has become rather impossible for both of them to separate ways. Musharraf’s dictatorial predecessor and ideologically opposite General Ziaul Haq had at least kept the option of becoming “nationalist” after the US started distancing itself from the jihad in Afghanistan. Musharraf, on the other hand, has made sure that the United States continues to be on his side, even amid the unquestionable dwindling of public support for him in Pakistan.
In other words, the US ties with Pakistan in the post-9/11 era have essentially been grounded in Bush’s relations with Musharraf. Washington was not satisfied with the performance of his regime in the War on Terror. It was only after Benazir successfully assured the Bush Administration to deliver more proactively in this war that the so-called deal between her and General Musharraf came into the picture.
Under the US script, while Musharraf’s civilian presidency will represent the factor of continuity in the War on Terror, Benazir standing on his side as Prime Minister would represent greater delivery in this war effort, one that meeting growing US demands from Pakistan with respect to the counter-terror effort against al-Qaeda, Taliban and their extremist-terrorist affiliates, especially in the strife-torn tribal belt bordering Afghanistan.
Bhutto’s arrival in Pakistan, the issuance of National Reconciliation Ordinance and her party’s decision not to boycott the January 8 elections are generally perceived to be part and parcel of the Bush Administration’s political script for Pakistan for the next five years’ governance, for the realization of which elections are a principal means. That explains why US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte rushed to the country after the imposition of emergency on November 3, urging politicians to “reconcile” their differences and stay away from a course of “brinkmanship.” He and the US envoy in Pakistan, who visited Bhutto in Karachi as soon as Mr Negroponte left, convinced the PPP leader not to boycott the polls. Ambassador Patterson has since been most active.
Ties with US minus interference
One can understand that Washington is giving billions of dollars of aid to Pakistan, and, therefore, it has to have an influence on what the country does or does not do. But then, simultaneously, it can be argued that most of the US aid is meant for Pakistan’s counter-terrorism effort. Given that, the Bush administration can justify its criticism of Pakistan’s performance in the War on Terror in the past couple of years, but the aid factor does not give a carte blanche to so flagrantly call the shots in Pakistani politics.
One is not necessarily arguing here that Pakistan’s counter-terrorism cooperation with the United States is not in our national interest. It is, and we should rather be more proactive and creative in combating religious extremism and terrorism—which has been a long-standing threat to our territorial integrity, even pre-dating the 9/11 terrorist events in the United States. The danger from extremism and terrorism will continue, and, as long as it does, we in Pakistan should cooperate with the international community, including the United States, to combat it effectively.
The most critical issue for us, however, is that as we move along with the United States and other influential members of the international community in this great cause, we should make sure that the latter stay away from interfering in our domestic political affairs. In this context, the most objectionable statement thus far has been issued by the leader of MQM from London, Altaf Hussain, who recently stated that since Americans give Pakistan billions of US dollars in aid, they have every right to intervene in its politics.
Others Join the Race
If the interference issue was limited to the US, as a negative outcome of our special ties with Washington, then the matter was not that serious. It is serious because many other states and leaders have joined the race.
The recent visit of the Turkish President Abdullah Gul is an example. During this visit, he met everybody that matters or does not matter in politics, telling them to see the “big picture” and participate in “polls.” He stood side-by-side with Musharraf in a bid to legitimize the civilian presidency of a Turkish-speaking leader of Pakistan, even if Musharraf’s imposition of emergency and repressive steps against judiciary and media had made it controversial.
Take also the case of Nawaz Sharif. His exile to Saudi Arabia was made possible through a deal, which was secured with the help of Saudi monarch Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz and former late Lebanese premier Rafiq Harairi. That being the case, both Sharif and Musharraf stand accused of welcoming external interference. If this was not enough, the Saudi intelligence chief and Saad Harairi were hurriedly invited to the Presidency to address a press conference a day before Mr Sharif landed in Islamabad in September only to be sent again into Saudi exile.
Now there are widespread public speculations that Mr Sharif is back in Pakistan because the Saudi leadership does not want Benazir Bhutto to become the country’s prime minister again. It is said that General Musharraf’s unscheduled visit to Saudi Arabia days before Mr Sharif’s return was to prevent the latter’s return, and that the Saudi monarch refuse to oblige Musharraf on the matter. In the past week, the Saudi story took yet another dramatic turn when Saudi ambassador Ali Asseri met the former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry at his residence in Islamabad in protective custody, inviting him to perform Haj.
There are examples from Pakistan’s recent history when a former Chairman of the Senate—i.e., Waseem Sajjad—would refuse to attend the July 4th US national day reception at the US embassy in Islamabad, where he was the chief guest, after his official car was stopped at the embassy gate for search by the security guards. But there are also examples when another leader of the country’s parliament, Ilahi Bakhsh Soomro would treat the visiting British Queen right inside the august house in a manner as if Pakistan was still under British colonial rule.
Some Comparative Cases
One is not being overtly patriotic or ultra-nationalist in whatever one has argued above. It is just that the country’s ruling elites should have some shame in representing the people’s collective will before foreigners. Pakistan emerged as a proud nation sixty years ago from united India. In India, there have many instances where the nationalist fervor proved to be an effective hedge against foreign interference.
For instance, back in early 1990s, the then US Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphael during her visit to India had issued just one statement critical of India’s human right violation in Kashmir, which created a unanimous political opposition across India against US policy on Kashmir. Even during the post-9/11 crisis between India and Pakistan, the Indians refused to give a red carpet welcome to US Secretary of State Colin Powell because he spoke in favor of Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir while visiting Islamabad before heading to New Delhi.
But this does not mean that Indian politicians leave their Pakistani counterparts behind insofar as their slavish mentality dating back to the white colonial rule in the Subcontinent is concerned. Remember when in the year 2000 former US President Bill Clinton visited South Asia! He came to address the parliament in New Delhi, where the images of MPs trying to touch his hands—a situation that led to a stampede in the august house of the “world’s largest democracy”—are unforgettable.
But even at that time, Pakistan had taken a lead over India. Clinton came to Pakistan reluctantly, spending only a few hours there as compared to a few days’ stay in India, and then lectured Pakistanis on state PTV on the benefits of democracy.
Beyond Banning the Meetings
All said and done, it is good that at least the Foreign Office has issued a warning to the ambassadors in Islamabad not to issue public statements on matters politically internal to Pakistan. The government has to take a step further in discouraging them from meeting politicians in the run up to the elections, or even in its aftermaths. Their conduct should be specifically related to bilateral matters, fostering the inter-state ties—as it should be the case under the UN Charter.
If the slavish mentality has taken sixty years to mature in the case of Pakistan’s elites—including politicians and civil-military bureaucrats—it will take a long time for such a mentality to change, but there is no reason why a start of sorts for such a happy outcome cannot be made now.
