Secondly, offensive, quick and robust operations were practiced in these military exercises. Thirdly, day and night capabilities were displayed. Fourthly, the Indian military tested its NCW capabilities, latest weapons and equipments, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), UAVs, Satellite imagery, Special Forces, blitzkrieg-type armoured incursion by Mechanized and Re-organised Plains Infantry Division, emphasising rapid penetration into enemy territory.
The Indian military has improved its operational capabilities after the inception of CSD in 2004. Indian surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities have been improved in last six years. It has been practicing these capabilities in almost all military exercises since 2004. India has also practiced its night time war fighting capabilities. Its aircraft and tanks are now capable to carry out operations in the dark. This capability will remove Indian military’s caveat to launch night time operations against Pakistan. Indian military has also improved its NCW and EW capabilities.
These capabilities are essential for an effective command and control system. Additionally, in almost all exercises the army has tested elements from its strike corps. India has improved its overall capabilities to launch short duration operations against Pakistan. It has also practiced air mobility of its forces, weapons, equipment and logistics. These exercises will perk up Indian operational capabilities to launch offensive operations behind the enemy lines, with unhindered supply of logistics, weapons, equipment and reinforcement. IAF has also participated in every exercise since 2004.
The IAF practiced its capabilities to carry out combined operations with the Indian Army. It could be assessed from the last seven years that the IAF and army may have developed synergy to some extent for joint operations. Such a development is essential for any offensive operations against Pakistan under the India’s CSD. But it is difficult to ascertain that whether India has fully achieved required capabilities to execute its CSD against Pakistan. Because military exercises are totally different from the real wars. Sometime it becomes difficult to assess the enemy response from small level exercises.
Moreover, coordination and integrated operations are essential for the implementation of the India’s CSD. Though India practiced these elements in its military exercises, full coordination and integration among the armed forces is a difficult proportion to achieve. Without proper coordination and understanding between the Indian armed forces, India’s CSD will be impossible to operationalize. India’s CSD is still in experimental phase. But the Indian Army is rapidly heading towards its operationalization. It requires more time to practice and operationalise its CSD.
Exercise Vijayee Bhava is also a step towards the operationalisation of Cold Start Doctrine, but efficacy of any doctrine could only be assessed in the real war not in mere exercises. Still there are organizational and infrastructural barriers in the operationalisation of the CSD. Under CSD, India will place eight IBGs close to the border with Pakistan to save mobilisation time. CSD is based on offensive operations against Pakistan which will require re-location of the strike formations headquarters, armoured divisions and armoured brigades from their existing locations in Central India and in depth in Punjab to forward locations near to the border for quick response to any alleged terrorist attack on India. All such formations are required to move forward towards the general line of Jammu, Amritsar, Moga, Barmer, Jaisalmer, Bikaner, Suratgarh and Palanpur from their present locations in the interior to execute Indian CSD. But infrastructural barriers play a critical role in materializing Indian CSD.
It will require massive allocations of funds and time to build new cantonments and facilities for the division-sized IBGs at the forward locations near to the Pakistan border. So far, there has been little progress in this regard. Therefore, it will be very difficult for the Indian Army to launch offensive operations without removing infrastructure barriers. Other impediment in the implementation of India’s CSD is the shortage of weapons and equipment in the Indian military. Although India is spending billions of dollars to overcome its military deficiencies, despite that it is facing shortage in military weaponry and equipment. To operationalise India’s CSD effectively, the Indian military would require swift, quick and mobile tanks.
India is largely depended on Russia for its MBT T-90s. On the other hand, its own MBT Vijayant and the ageing T-55s are still in the Indian Army’s inventory despite their obsolescence. The indigenously developed Arjun MBT has not quite met the army’s expectations due to recurring technological problems and cost over-runs. India will have to rely on Russia for the supply of T-90s and their spare parts. Such dependence would continue in future. It is expected that India would take at least a decade to replace its ageing tanks with Russian T-90s to overcome this deficiency. IAF is also facing shortage of fighter jets, but India will overcome that shortage in the near future. The other important caveat in the operationalisation of CSD against Pakistan is the element of surprise. Due to lack of strategic depth, most of the Pakistan military’s deployment is close to the border with India. This lack of strategic depth will be an asset for it in case of any war. The already stationed Pakistan Army near the border will take comparatively less time than India to deploy its forces at the border. In this case, the element of surprise will vanish, putting the India forces in disarray.
India’s strategy aims to achieve surprise and speed in a conventional strike against Pakistan. It overlooks the fact that in a crisis, the nuclear threshold will be uncertain. It would be difficult for India to control the situation if it escalated. It would be a strategic blunder for India if it attacks Pakistan because the threshold of any country cannot be just wished away by any aggressive attack. Shorter time and fast mobilisation will enhance the probability of escalation. Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) in near future cannot be operationalised. But in case if it does, then Pakistan will definitely change its force posture accordingly.
It is imperative for the international community including US, European Union and other regional powers to step in and mediate between Pakistan and India and resolve their outstanding issues including Kashmir, Water distribution, Siachen, and Sir Creek. The best option left for both countries is to stick to the dialogue process and try to resolve their lingering issues in an amicable way because use of force or policy of coercion will never resolve differences between Pakistan and India.